Galatians and works

a " distinction between the works of the ceremonial law as part of the Old Covenant, and works of the moral law, done in a state of grace in the New Covenant, out of love [agape] for God. In his letter to the Galatians, St. Paul wasn’t condemning (or even referring to) growth in justification through good works done in a state of grace; he was condemning a return to the Old Covenant by Christians, because that was a rejection of the New Covenant and implicitly a rejection of Jesus as the Messiah who established the New Covenant in which the requirement of those ceremonial laws is done away. If you don’t understand the distinction between the ceremonial law and the moral law, then you have entirely misunderstood Paul’s point in his letter to the Galatians" [quote found here: http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/12/justification-catholic-church-and-the-judaizers/]

"The Catholic Church rejects the requirement of returning to the Old Covenant for justification or salvation. From the Catholic point of view, adding the requirements of the ceremonial law would be nothing less than apostasy from the New Covenant established by the blood of Jesus Christ, the Lamb of God. So in this respect, the Catholic Church does not fall under St. Paul’s condemnation of the doctrine of the Judaizers."

from the comment section

"The distinction between justification and its increase is not trivial. It makes the difference between Pelagianism and the orthodox Catholic faith. The notion that we can justify ourselves by our own works, is nothing less than Pelagianism. But the notion that when in a state of grace, none of our good deeds really matters for our eternal condition, is temporal nihilism. So the distinction between justification and its increase is essential for avoiding both of those alternatives."

"The person who by acts of love (agape) increases his justification is subsequently “different” only in that it is a greater participation in the divine nature. But, there is no part of our justification that is from us, as though justification could be divided into parts. The conjunction of divine and human causality in the increase in justification is not part/part, as though God does part and we do part. God justifies us, but not without our free consent. Likewise, our actions in a state of grace are gratuitously meritorious, because it is God who freely and graciously granted us this grace, and every subsequent good act, done by us inagape, is a divinely-granted gift of participation in that divine movement of justification we received through our baptism.

. If “initial justification” determined our “future justification”, all the Scriptural warnings about perseverance and apostasy would not only be misguided; they would be heretical, i.e. contradicting the doctrine that initial justification guarantees future justification.

imputation or infusion

http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/08/imputation-and-paradigms-a-reply-to-nicholas-batzig/#comment-36209
here is part from the above link: 

First, Catholics believe in imputation. God forgives our sins, and in that sense does not impute our sins. (Rom 4:8) God also imputes righteousness to us (Rom 4:5), by counting as righteousness the living faith He has given us, by which we truly are righteous. From a Catholic point of view, the problem is not imputation per se, but the extra nos conception of imputation, which, from a Catholic point of view makes God out to be either a liar or self-deceived.

Lane claims that the Protestant doctrine of imputation does not assume the list-paradigm. But, here’s why it does. If agape were recognized as the fulfillment of the law, there would be no need for extra nos imputation. God would count us as righteous because we are (by His doing) truly internally righteous. So in this way, the need for extra nos imputation depends on the list-paradigm notion thatagape is not the fulfillment of the law.

Lane writes:

In looking at the comments, there are a couple more things necessary to say. Firstly, though this is indeed debated in Protestantism, I would disagree with Cross’s claim that Protestants do not believe that a person can be truly righteous internally. … This does not mean that we are ever perfect. Perfection is for eternity. However, it does mean that we can be really righteous internally, the imperfection also being covered by the blood of the Lamb.

Lane claims that in this present life we can be internally righteous, but not internally perfect. That would make perfection a higher standard than righteousness, and would make righteousness itself imperfect. I have explained in the comments above a way in which Catholic doctrine understands righteousness to be in the will, even while concupiscence and vices remain in other powers of the soul. If that is what Lane too is saying (regarding this distinction between being truly righteous internally, and being perfect internally) then our respective positions are closer than might initially appear. However, if Lane is saying that that within us by which God judges us to be righteous is at the same time imperfect, or that that within us by which God judges us to be perfect is at the same time unrighteous, then his position is both theologically and philosophically problematic, because it entails either two ultimate standards, or the worthlessness of perfect righteousness.

Lane then adds

Cross’s claim that when Paul uses Abraham as a paradigm for believers in Romans 4 and Galatians 3, that it was not in every respect that Abraham was a paradigm is an evasion. The particular aspect in which Abraham is a paradigm is with regard to imputed righteousness apart from any aspect of his own law-keeping and apart from any ceremony or sacrament! This is explicitly true in Romans 4:11

Merely asserting that what I said is “an evasion” does not show it to be false. Likewise, merely asserting that the particular aspect in which Abraham is an example is with respect to [extra nos] imputed righteousness is question-begging, in that Lane presupposes that the imputation going on in Gen 15:6 is extra nos imputation, and not imputation by way of infused living faith. Nothing about Romans 4:11 is incompatible with the Catholic doctrine, as was explained in the comments above.

Lastly, Lane claims that Abraham was justified only once, and that it took place at the time recorded in Gen 15:6. He writes:

Secondly, Abraham was not reckoned righteous before God in the justificatory sense more than once. … So, in Abraham’s case, he was declared to be justified in Genesis 15.

The purpose of my post was not about demonstrating how many times Abraham was justified or when he was justified. So this is a bit of a rabbit trail. But it is worth considering. In Reformed theology, the unjustified person is said to be dead in sin, bereft of faith, hope, agape, living only in sin, having “wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation,” and “being altogether averse from that good.” (WCF IX.3) In Reformed theology, unregenerate man is “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil.” (WCF VI.4)

However, that’s not the picture we get of the man Scripture calls ‘Abram’ in Genesis chapters 12-14. Scripture says in Gen. 12:1-4 that God spoke to Abram and that Abram obeyed the Lord’s call to leave Ur. Then the Lord appeared to him at the oak of Moreh, and said, “To your descendants I will give this land.” How did Abram respond? “So he built an altar there to the LORD who had appeared to him.” (Gen 12:7) The verse doesn’t say that he worshipped the Lord there, but in the context (as shown below) we can presume that he did. (Why else does one build an altar to the LORD?) Abram’s worshipful response to God’s promise is one of trust in the Lord’s promise, just as he responded to God’s promise in Gen 15:6.

Then in Gen 12:8, on the mountain east of Bethel, Abram “built an altar to the LORD and called upon the name of the LORD.” Is this really the picture of a man dead in trespasses and sins, “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good”? How is a man who is completely dead in trespasses and sins responding to the Lord’s promises by building altars to Him, and calling upon His Name? Was Abram faking it, merely pretending to worship God, while actually hating God in his heart? There is no sign at all in the text of such a thing.

Then in Gen 13:4 Abram returns to the altar on the mountain east of Bethel, and there again he calls on the name of the LORD. That’s not the behavior of one dead in sins. Ten verses later God speaks to Abram again in Gen 13:14-17, promising him and his descendants the land. Abram accepts God’s promise, and moves to Hebron, letting Lot have the seemingly better land. Does a man dead in trespasses and sins trust God’s word in this way?

Then in Gen 14, Melchizedek says, “Blessed be Abram of God Most High.” Melchizedek was not merely saying that Abram was one more piece of God’s property, as are trees and flowers and birds. Abram was “of God” in the sense that he was a man of faith, a friend of God. Abram then participates in a proto-typical Eucharist, receiving the bread and wine from the priest Melchizedek. Should we think that the proto-typical Eucharistic event involves the reception of this prefigurement of the sacrament by an unregenerate man dead in sins? Then Abram, this man allegedly dead in sin, with no faith and noagape, pays a tithe to Melchizedek, “the priest of God Most High.” Abram then reveals that he has made an oath to God, and keeps his oath. (Gen 14:22) Should paying his tithe to the Lord, and keeping his oath to God be construed as the activity of one dead in sins and at enmity with God, “utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good”? Which is more difficult to believe, that Abram is only faking love for God in all this, or that he is in fact a man of faith? On top of that, Hebrews 11:8 tells us that “By faith Abraham, when he was called, obeyed by going out to a place which he was to receive for an inheritance; and he went out, not knowing where he was going.” So Scripture itself explicitly states that Abraham left Ur by faith. If justification is a once-in-a-lifetime event, and faith is sufficient for justification, then Abraham was already justified when he left Ur, and thus couldn’t have been justified by the act of faith described in Gen 15.

end of quote
so

"First, Catholics believe in imputation. God forgives our sins, and in that sense does not impute our sins. (Rom 4:8) God also imputes righteousness to us (Rom 4:5), by counting as righteousness the living faith He has given us, by which we truly are righteous. From a Catholic point of view, the problem is not imputation per se, but the extra nos conception of imputation, which, from a Catholic point of view makes God out to be either a liar or self-deceived. "

"In justification God does not impute our sins to us, because they are covered by the satisfactory sacrifice of Christ, as explained above. And He imputes righteousness to us by counting infused living faith as righteousness, because, as explained above, the agape that is true righteousness is intrinsic to living faith."
  above from comment 71 By Bryan here  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2013/01/holy-church-finding-jesus-as-a-reverted-catholic-a-testimonial-response-to-chris-castaldo/#comment-47012

1. http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/09/i-fought-the-church-and-the-church-won/#comment-38720 from comment 362 Jason Stillman
   The actual issue was the fact that I began to realize that the Reformed doctrine of imputation, in addition to being biblically attested to only in the most thin and sketchy sense, was rendered unnecessary once the New Covenant is truly understood. If the law of the Spirit frees us from the law of sin by internally inscribing the law, thus fulfilling in us the righteous requirement of the law (Rom. 8:1-4), then there is simply no need for the imputation of alien righteousness for the purpose of forensic acquittal in a law court.
   So I maintain my prior Reformed orthodoxy in that I was trying to keep justification distinct from sanctification ......The problem was that Reformed theology, by insisting on extra nos imputation ..... makes the New Covenant an afterthought, while insisting on the spiritual dynamic of the New Covenant makes imputation unnecessary.

see also the difference between imputation and extra nos imputation: http://nannykim-catholicconsiderations.blogspot.com/2012/08/explanation-of-why-external-imputation.html

http://www.devinrose.heroicvirtuecreations.com/blog/2012/06/12/a-study-on-imputation-of-righteousness/here  This is a very interesting article on this subject. The quotes by ladd and D.A. Carson are are very interesting because Romans 4 doesn't say Christ's righteousness is imputed to us. It says  a peron's '"faith is reckoned as righteousness"

also: Rom 4:5 : http://catholicnick.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-second-most-important-passage-in.html

and II Cor 5: 21: http://catholicnick.blogspot.com/2012/08/the-third-most-important-passage-in.html


comment 217
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/08/imputation-and-paradigms-a-reply-to-nicholas-batzig/  shows how different views on righteousness effect this see also the next two videos: here

below from http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/07/st-augustine-on-law-and-grace/

What does it mean that God does not impute sin? A man who is truly contrite and repentant has living faith and therefore, because he seeks mercy and grace from God, God gives him mercy, not counting his past sins against him. Faith is not proud before God, but humble before God, seeking mercy. And therefore to the one seeking mercy, mercy is shown. By grace God does not treat us as our sins deserve, but grants to us the agape whereby we are made righteous.

 
Above is the Catholic view and below the reformed Protestant view





Below is another view of a different kind of Protestant


Here is more on the Catholic view of infusion: http://vivacatholic.wordpress.com/2009/02/17/infused-righteousness-versus-imputed-righteousness-which-one-entitles-us-to-enter-heaven/

One against the RC view: http://www.presenttruthmag.com/archive/XX/20-8.htm

One for the RC view and against RC Sproul junior:http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/05/imputation-and-infusion-a-reply-to-r-c-sproul-jr/

a quote from:http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/06/augustinian-soteriolog/

Alister McGrath:

“it will be clear that the medieval period was astonishingly faithful to the teaching of Augustine on the question of the nature of justification, where the Reformers departed from it,” and later, “The Reformation understanding of the nature of justification – as opposed to its mode – must therefore be regarded as a genuine theological novum.”¹

McGrath also says: “Luther erected a specific understanding of justification that departs significantly from Augustine at two points of major importance-the notion of justifying righteousness as alien (rather than inherent) to the believer, and a tendency to treat justification as involving two notionally distinct elements. This late trend eventually led to the development of forensic notions of justification in the writing of Melanchthon and others.”²

I wrote the following in a discussion online:

I suppose you and M......(51) are both correct. I think M... was answering my direct question which was related to the fact that imputation from the Protestant perspective does not produce an internal change in the believer. I just checked with Berkhof and he does state, basically, what Michael did concerning this subject of inner change. Berkhof says (page 512),

With respect to the nature of justification the Reformers corrected the error of confounding justification with sanctification by stressing its legal character and representing it as an act of God’s free grace, whereby He pardons our sins and accepts us as righteous in His sight, but does not change us inwardly.

Berkhof adds to this on page 513,

Justification is a judicial act of God, in which He declares, on the basis of the righteousness of Jesus Christ, that all the claims of the law are satisfied with respect to the sinner. It is unique in the application of the work of redemption in that it is a judicial act of God, a declaration respecting the sinner, and not an act or process of renewal, such as regeneration, conversion, and sanctification. While it has respect to the sinner, it does not change his inner life. It does not affect his condition, but his state, and in that respect differs from all the other principal parts of the order of salvation.

Berkhof later sates on the top of page 514,

In distinction from it [justification]sanctification is a continuous process, which is never completed in this life.

Therefore the imputation [which justification is concerned with] does nothing to change the inner life according to Berkhof. It does not change the man’s condition , but his state.

My question to Michael was also dealing with the subject of what it means to be partakers of the divine nature and how or whether this differed from imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Perhaps some of the differences are in regard to what Berkhof calls ”man’s condition” and man’s “state”. The aspect of being partakers of the divine nature would be in regards to man’s condition, I suppose?. I think I find the Protestant’s way of separating these things strange. Salvation has to include regeneration, conversion, sanctification, yet as Berkhof shows , the Protestants [Reformed ones] separate these things from Justification. As you have stated , these things basically will necessarily follow according to the views of the Reformed. I understand. The Catholic view seems to gather in the whole work of salvation and the Reformed view seems to splinter it.[In my opinion].

I do find it interesting that Berkhof on page 511 says that the doctrine of justification by faith “did not find its classical expression until the days of the reformation”.

Then CL responded to me here in comment 68 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/how-the-church-won-an-interview-with-jason-stellman/#comment-40023

In reading your comment, with the excerpts from Berkhof, I may have found a more precise way to state what I was trying to say earlier. It is definitely true that, in the Reformed understanding, imputation, in and of itself, produces no internal change in the believer. Imputation is God crediting of Christ’s perfect righteousness to the believer, and this crediting has to do with how God chooses to *view* the believer (i.e. as having the righteousness of Christ.

However, the internal change, in a sense, has already come (again, in the Reformed understanding) with *regeneration*, which precedes and causes faith, through which comes justification. Because of one’s God-enabled faith alone in Christ alone (in the specific way that the Reformed understand this matter), one is justified, and God imputes the perfect righteousness of Christ to oneself. Again, Berkhof states the Reformed view correctly in saying that this imputation produces no internal change in the believer. The internal change actually comes *before* imputation, with God’s regeneration of the believer, which the Reformed understand to be monergistic. The internal change then continues through sanctification, which historic Reformed Protestantism (in my understanding, at least) holds to be synergistic.

I agree with you completely that the historic Reformed view separates the various aspects of salvation in a way that the Catholic Church’s teaching does not– and I agree that the Reformed view separates certain of these aspects in a strange and unnecessary way. As a Protestant, obviously, I viewed the separation between justification and sanctification to be at the very heart of the Gospel. However, when I made the conscious choice to re-study the Bible without my “Reformed lenses,” I began to see this sharp Reformed distinction between justification and sanctification as a matter of Reformed *eisegesis*, rather than exegesis. While we cannot be justified by works alone, neither can we be justified by a “faith alone,” even in Christ alone, that is devoid of works.

The interesting thing is, Reformed Christians would actually *agree* with Catholic Christians that a professed “faith alone,” without works, does not save. However, the Reformed would say that such a faith is simply not Christian faith at all, whereas Catholics would say that it could still be “Christian faith,” in some sense, but that even a fervently professed Christian faith, without works, will not justify anyone before God and does not save him/her.

It’s tragic, really. The historic Reformed view (following Calvin, especially) on justification and works/sanctification has much more in common with the Catholic Church’s teaching than many Reformed people seem to realize– and yet, many Reformed Protestants continue to say that the Catholic Church does not have “the Biblical Gospel.” I made that claim myself as a Reformed Baptist. From my standpoint now though, as a Catholic “revert,” we Catholics are simply following the words of Jesus, and St. Paul, and St. James on justification and works– *as* those words are rightly understood, as they have been taught by the Church for 2,000 years from Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition.

The Protestant Reformation introduced sharp theological distinctions in a salvific process that had not been understood, nor taught, for the previous 1, 500 years of Christianity. Or, as you wrote:

I do find it interesting that Berkhof on page 511 says that the doctrine of justification by faith “did not find its classical expression until the days of the reformation”.

from comment 98 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/how-the-church-won-an-interview-with-jason-stellman/#comment-40088

It might be helpful, towards appreciating the sufficiency of sanctifying grace with infused charity, to consider what is supposed to be the most important “negative” benefit of the extra nosimputation of the alien righteous of Christ: Without this kind of imputation all men would be condemned to Hell, which is the eternal penalty for not fulfilling the law. In Catholic theology, on the other hand, sanctifying grace with infused charity is sufficient for the negative benefit of not being condemned to Hell, apart from extra nos imputation of alien righteousness, apart from any additional graces (such as are made available by indulgences and pilgrimages), and even with venial sins.

from comment 102

Rather, I wanted to point out that, in Catholic theology, sanctifying grace with infused charity is sufficient for salvation from Hell, even if the person who has inherent grace and charity also has venial sins, and so is temporarily prevented from entering Heaven.

...........Your question in comment #22 might be problematic for the thesis that “infused agape fulfills the law (venial sins notwithstanding) and so renders extra nos imputation redundant” if the benefit of fulfilling the law had only a positive aspect (going to Heaven) and not also a negative one (being saved from Hell). But if we agree that being saved from Hell is a benefit of fulfilling the law, then it is no telling criticism of the aforementioned thesis to point out that, for Catholic theology, merely having infused agape (with the presence of venial sin) is not sufficient for entering Heaven. One needs to also show that, for Catholic theology, infused agape (with the presence of venial sin) is not sufficient for avoiding Hell.

from here 156 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/08/imputation-and-paradigms-a-reply-to-nicholas-batzig/comment-page-4/#comment-36289

Regarding justification the Council of Trent taught the following:

the single formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just, that, namely, with which we being endowed by Him, are renewed in the spirit of our mind,[36] and not only are we reputed but we are truly called and are just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to everyone as He wills,[37] and according to each one’s disposition and cooperation. (Council of Trent, Session Six, chapter 7)

Notice first that there is only one formal cause of justification, not two. This is restated in Canon 10 of that same session:

CANON X.-If any one saith, that men are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He merited for us to be justified; or that it is by that justice itself that they are formally just; let him be anathema.

The first part of the canon anathematizes the claim that any man is justified without the justice of Christ by which He merited for us to be justified. That’s talking about the obedience of Christ in His human will, and the meriting is referring to the way in which Christ through His human will made atonement, by giving to the Father in loving sacrificial obedience that which is more pleasing than all our sins, such that we can be forgiven and made righteous by the gifts of sanctifying grace and infused agape (see “Catholic and Reformed Conceptions of the Atonement“).
The second part of canon 10 is anathematizing the claim that the formal justice of the redeemed is Christ’s obedience. It is anathematizing the claim that our righteousness is Christ’s obedience [in His human will] imputed [extra nos] to us.
Now look back at chapter 7 of Session Six, to the section I quoted at the very beginning of this comment. It says, “the single formal cause is the justice of God, not that by which He Himself is just, but that by which He makes us just.” What is being referred to there (in “that by which He makes us just”) is infused agape, as becomes evident from the rest of the paragraph. And this single formal cause is “not that by which He Himself is just,” which rules out it being either God Himself or the obedience of Christ’s human will.
As I explained in the comments above, infused agape is a participation in the divine nature. And participations are created, and thus not God Himself, as I explained in the second paragraph of comment #7 in the “A Reply to R.C. Sproul Regarding the Catholic Doctrines of Original Sin and and Free Will” thread. But even though participations are created, when the participation is a participation in the divine nature, that in which the creature is participating is uncreated. So Christ is our righteousness in these two ways, by meriting for us the gifts of sanctifying grace and agape, and by being the righteousness in which we participate by infused agape. But according to Trent, Christ’s obedience is not imputed [extra nos] to us.
You wrote:

If Catholics would concede that there is imputation of righteousness

There is an imputation of righteousness. As I said in commment #140, “God also imputes righteousness to us (Rom 4:5), by counting as righteousness the living faith He has given us, by which we truly are righteous.” You seem to be assuming that the only kind of imputation is extra nos. But in the Catholic paradigm God counts or reckons us righteous by making us actually righteous, so that His counting/reckoning is true (since God is the Truth and cannot lie).

and found here  http://pontifications.wordpress.com/justification/  found in the Sept 13 section

 “The grace of Christ,” the Catholic Catechism tells us, “is the gratuitous gift that God makes to us of his own life, infused by the Holy Spirit into our soul to heal it of sin and to sanctify it. It is the sanctifying or deifying grace received in Baptism. It is in us the source of the work of sanctification.” At no point, according to the Catholic Church, can justification be understood as sinful man pulling himself up by his bootstraps; nor can it be understood as man earning his way into heaven by his good works; nor can it even be understood as a team effort, with God doing his part (perhaps a big part) and man doing his part (perhaps just a little bitty part). The work of justification is God’s work. God justifies man by graciously incorporating him through Baptism into his Trinitarian life and making him a new creation by the Holy Spirit.

from comment 450 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/08/imputation-and-paradigms-a-reply-to-nicholas-batzig  --

 Extra nos means outside of us; “infused” means poured into us. Extra nos is not about the source or origin of the righteous, but about where it is in relation to us. Extra nos imputation means that the righteousness is outside of us, and not within us. That’s how it differs from the Catholic conception of imputation, which is not extra nos. (See comment #140 above, where I explain the Catholic conception of imputation, which is not extra nos.)

see also http://catholicnick.blogspot.com/2014/09/is-imputation-taught-in-2-corinthians.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NicksCatholicBlog+%28NICK%27S+CATHOLIC+BLOG%29
for example from this link: 

The Church Fathers whom I was able to find commenting on 2 Corinthians 5:21 formed a general consensus on what “made sin” referred to. Consider: 

Augustine: "on account of the likeness of sinful flesh in which He came, He was called sin" (Enchiridion, Ch41)

Augustine: "For God made Christ Himself to be sin for us, on account of the likeness of sinful flesh, that we may be made the righteousness of God in Him." (Commentary on Psalm 119, Ain, Section 122)

Gregory Nyssa: "He made Him to be sin for us, Who knew no sin,” giving once more the name of “sin” to the flesh." (Against Eunomius, Book 6, Section 1)

Gregory of Nazianzen: "And so the passage, The Word was made Flesh, seems to me to be equivalent to that in which it is said that He was made sin." (Letter To Cledonius [Epistle CI])

Hilary: “To condemn sin through sin in the flesh, He Who knew no sin was Himself made sin; that is, by means of the flesh to condemn sin in the flesh, He became flesh on our behalf but knew not flesh” (On the Trinity, Book 10, Section 47)

Ambrose: “Christ is said to have been made, but of a woman; that is, He was “made” as regards his birth from a Virgin … He Who in his flesh bore our flesh, in His body bore our infirmities and our curses … So it is written elsewhere: Who knew no sin, but was made sin for us” (Against Auxentius, Section 25)

Pope Leo the Great: "When the evangelist says, “The Word became flesh and dwelt in us,” and the Apostle, “God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself,” it was shown that the Only-begotten of the Most High Father entered on such a union with human humility, that, when He took the substance of our flesh and soul, He remained one and the same Son of God." (Sermon LXIII.1)

The 'consensus' among the Fathers on the meaning of "made sin" in 2 Corinthians 5:21is that it refers to "the Word was made flesh," the Son becoming Incarnate, which is also why they also linked 2 Corinthians 5:21 directly to Romans 8:3, "By sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh." Using the principle of Scripture-interprets-Scripture, that's what "made sin" means, and it's not hard to see.

But there is a 'bonus' here that need not be ignored either, and that is the words "andfor sin" which immediately follows is the Greek phrase peri hamartias (περὶ ἁμαρτίας), the very phrase mentioned earlier, which does indeed refer to "sin offering"! So both realities, Incarnation and sin offering, are certainly present, even if the Incarnation is the more central. 

Causes of Justification according to council of Trent

Found in session 6 of the Council of Trent --the decree on Justification in

CHAPTER VII. (full document here: http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/trentall.html)

What the justification of the impious is, and what are the causes thereof.
This disposition, or preparation, is followed by Justification itself, which is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace, and of the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend, that so he may be an heir according to hope of life everlasting.

Of this Justification the causes are these: the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is a merciful God who washes and sanctifies gratuitously, signing, and anointing with the holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance; but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only-begotten, our Lord Jesus Christ, who, when we were enemies, for the exceeding charity wherewith he loved us, merited Justification for us by His most holy Passion on the wood of the cross, and made satisfaction for us unto God the Father; the instru-[Page 35]mental cause is the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which (faith) no man was ever justified; lastly, the alone formal cause is the justice of God, not that whereby He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed by Him, are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and we are not only reputed, but are truly called, and are, just, receiving justice within us, each one according to his own measure, which the Holy Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and according to each one's proper disposition and co-operation. For, although no one can be just, but he to whom the merits of the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated, yet is this done in the said justification of the impious, when by the merit of that same most holy Passion, the charity of God is poured forth, by the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent therein: whence, man, through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted, receives, in the said justification, together with the remission of sins, all these (gifts) infused at once, faith, hope, and charity. For faith, unless hope and charity be added thereto, neither unites man perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body. For which reason it is most truly said, that Faith without works is dead and profitless; and, In Christ Jesus neither circumcision, availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which worketh by charity. This faith, Catechumen's beg of the Church-agreeably to a tradition of the apostles-previously to the sacrament of Baptism; when they beg for the faith which bestows life everlasting, which, without hope and charity, faith cannot bestow: whence also do they immediately hear that word of Christ; If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. Wherefore, when receiving true and Christian justice, they are bidden, immediately on being born again, to preserve it pure and spotless, as the first robe given them through Jesus Christ in lieu of that which [Page 36] Adam, by his disobedience, lost for himself and for us, that so they may bear it before the judgment-seat of our Lord Jesus Christ, and may have life everlasting.

also from comment   48    here: http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2013/01/holy-church-finding-jesus-as-a-reverted-catholic-a-testimonial-response-to-chris-castaldo/#comment-46784

First, you claim that there is a contradiction between Trent Session 6 Can. 9 and Scripture, namely (Rom 3:28, and Eph 2:8-9). But there is no contradiction. Trent Session 6 Canon 9 is condemning the notion that nothing at all is required on the part of the Catechumen to prepare to receive the grace of justification at baptism, that he need not repent of his sins or pray or love God or resolve to seek baptism. St. Paul, however, in Romans 3:28 is not speaking of what is required to prepare to receive the grace of justification in baptism, but of the impossibility of justification by works done apart from grace. Likewise, what Trent says about the necessity of preparing to receive the grace of justification in baptism is fully compatible with the truth St. Paul teaches in Ephesians 2:8-9, according to which saving faith is a gift from God, and not from ourselves, and that saving faith is not merited by works. So both of those passages are fully compatible with what Trent Session 6 Canon 9 says. And this also shows why your claim that the Catholic Church anathematizes St. Paul is incorrect.

also Canon 12 states:

 Canon 12.If anyone says that justifying faith is nothing else than confidence in divine mercy,[117] which remits sins for Christ's sake, or that it is this confidence alone that justifies us, let him be anathema.

describing what this means in comment 152 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/12/justification-catholic-church-and-the-judaizers/

Yes, faith is more than trust, because trust has no necessary connection to divine revelation or articles of faith, whereas faith is that by which we yield our entire assent to whatever has been divinely revealed, because God has revealed it. One could “trust in divine mercy” while rejecting what God has revealed. That wouldn’t be true faith, because one could trust God in that way even if there were no divine revelation at all. Divine faith, by contrast, is assent to what is supernaturally revealed. See “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Relation of Faith to the Church.”

Great summary of the doctrine here:http://nannykim-catholicconsiderations.blogspot.com/2014/05/justification-summary-of-catholic.html

Catholic apologetics guide

Catholic Apologetics Guide 101

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Proof of God --by St. Thomas Aquinas

The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

predestination--a difference in Catholic and Protestants

This article link below explains some of the difference in the Catholic view of predestination

http://socrates58.blogspot.com/2010/04/biblical-evidence-against-double.html

also  http://www.thesumma.info/predestination/index.php   also

FROM COMMENT 68 

http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/05/predestination-john-calvin-vs-thomas-aquinas/

It seems to me that the difference between Calvin’s doctrine of reprobation, and that of the Catholic Church, should be clarified here. I agree that we should affirm common ground, but it is no less a vice to cover over actual disagreement than it is to find disagreement where there is none. And it seems to me that we should avoid both vices.

According to Calvin, reprobation is not consequent upon foreseen demerit, but is the reason why the reprobate fall into sin, remain in sin unto death, and so end up in hell as the just punishment for their sin. For Calvin, the reprobate are predestined to hell in the same way that the elect are predestined unto heaven, as an unconditional positive decree, to which the means to that end are then [in logical, not temporal order] determined. God decrees to damn some, and then [logically, not temporally] chooses the means of getting them to hell, namely, by decreeing their fall into sin, not giving them grace for salvation, and then justly punishing them for their sin. Calvin writes:

By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which He determined within Himself whatever He wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death. (Institutes, III.21.6)

In the words, God created two groups of people; one group was created for heaven, and the other group was created for hell. The damned were created for the purpose of glorifying God by their damnation; their sin and remaining in sin unto death are means to achieving the end for which God created them.

At last, he [St. Paul] concludes that God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. 9:18). You see how he refers both to the mere pleasure of God. Therefore, if we cannot assign any reason for his bestowing mercy on his people, but just that it so pleases him, neither can we have any reason for his reprobating others but his will. (Institutes III.22.11)

The reason God reprobates some is fundamentally His will, not any other reason, not on account of their foreseen demerit. (Here in this section, Calvin takes a divine command theory notion of the relation of God’s will to justice.)

Those, therefore, whom God passes by he reprobates, and that for no other cause but because he is pleased to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines to his children. … They [those who object to Calvin's doctrine] add also, that it is not without cause the vessels of wrath are said to be fitted for destruction, and that God is said to have prepared the vessels of mercy, because in this way the praise of salvation is claimed for God, whereas the blame of perdition is thrown upon those who of their own accord bring it upon themselves. But were I to concede that by the different forms of expression Paul softens the harshness of the former clause, it by no means follows, that he transfers the preparation for destruction to any other cause than the secret counsel of God. This, indeed, is asserted in the preceding context, where God is said to have raised up Pharaoh, and to harden whom he will. Hence it follows, that the hidden counsel of God is the cause of hardening. (Institutes III.23.1)

Again, for Calvin the reason for reprobation is not foreseen demerit, but God’s pleasure. God is pleased to exclude some of humanity from heaven, not because He foresees that they freely reject grace, but merely because it pleases Him to make some people for the purpose of eternal damnation. He says the same thing at the end of that section:

[W]e say, that God, according to the good pleasure of his will, without any regard to merit, elects those whom he chooses for sons, while he rejects and reprobates others. (Institutes III.23.10)

This notion of reprobation is contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church regarding reprobation. According to the Catholic teaching, hell is not positively decreed to the damned, and the reprobate are not predestined to fall into sin as a means to justly deserve hell. The Catholic teaching on reprobation can be seen in the Council of Orange (AD 529):

According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. (Council of Orange)

In this life the power of God does not leave anyone unable to avoid evil or be saved from evil, and thus the grace of God does not leave anyone unable to be saved. The notion that God foreordains anyone to evil by His power, rather than by allowing them to reject grace is anathematized.

This doctrine concerning reprobation can also be seen in the Council of Quiersy (AD 853):

The just and good God, however, chose from this same mass of perdition according to His foreknowledge those whom through grace He predestined to life [ Rom. 8:29 ff.; Eph. 1:11], and He predestined for these eternal life; the others, whom by the judgment of justice he left in the mass of perdition, however, He knew would perish, but He did not predestine that they would perish, because He is just; however, He predestined eternal punishment for them. (Denz. 316)

In other words, though God foreknew that the reprobate would perish, He did not predestine anyone to perish. He predestined a certain punishment [i.e. eternal punishment] for those whom He created for eternal life, but whom He knew would freely choose to reject grace, and whom He permitted to reject grace.

This same Catholic understanding of reprobation can be seen in the Third Council of Valence (AD 855):

Certainly neither (do we believe) that the foreknowledge of God has placed a necessity on any wicked man, so that he cannot be different, but what that one would be from his own will, as God, who knew all things before they are, He foreknew from His omnipotent and immutable Majesty. “Neither do we believe that anyone is condemned by a previous judgment on the part of God but by reason of his own iniquity.” “Nor (do we believe) that the wicked thus perish because they were not able to be good; but because they were unwilling to be good, they have remained by their own vice in the mass of damnation either by reason of original sin or even by actual sin.

[I]n the election, moreover, of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes the merited good. In the condemnation, however, of those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God. In predestination, however, (we believe) that God has determined only those things which He Himself either in His gratuitous mercy or in His just judgment would do …; in regard to evil men, however, we believe that God foreknew their malice, because it is from them, but that He did not predestine it, because it is not from Him. (We believe) that God, who sees all things, foreknew and predestined that their evil deserved the punishment which followed, because He is just, …. “But we do not only not believe the saying that some have been predestined to evil by divine power,” namely as if they could not be different, “but even if there are those who wish to believe such malice, with all detestation,” as the Synod of Orange, “we say anathema to them”. (Denz. 321-22)

Valence clarifies that by “predestined to evil by divine power” the meaning is that the reprobate could not but do evil, i.e. they could not choose to do right. And that entails that sufficient grace is offered to all, even the reprobate.

The Council of Trent likewise condemned double predestination, again with this language of divine power:

If anyone says that the grace of justification is shared by those only who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called are called indeed but receive not grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema. (Session VI, Canon 17)

Here again, the condemned position is one that predestines persons to evil by depriving them of the grace they need in order to obey God.

For Calvin it is false that God truly desires the salvation of all men without exception. But in the Catholic teaching God does desire the salvation of all men without exception; this is why (contra the Jansenists) the Church teaches that Christ died for all men without exception. (See here.) For Calvin, sufficient grace is not offered to the reprobate, but in Catholic doctrine sufficient grace is offered to all (otherwise, that would be double-predestination). For Calvin, the human will, being dead, does not participate voluntarily in regeneration (Institutes II.3.6), and cannot resist grace; therefore, since universalism is false, double predestination logically follows. But in Catholic doctrine, the will cooperates in regeneration (Council of Trent, VI, Canon 4), and can resist sufficient grace (which is offered to all), and therefore double predestination does not follow. So these are real, substantive differences between Calvin and the Catholic Church on the doctrine of reprobation.

In #53 you wrote:

but in my reading of Domingo Banez, he frequently quotes Romans 9:19 in his debates with the Jesuits. Of course, efficacious grace preserves the freedom of the will, but this grace is infallible in bringing about its intended effect. So, this grace is resistible in only a rather qualified sense, no?

For Báñez efficacious grace is not resistible, or at least not ultimately resistible, while sufficient grace is resistible. One difficulty for Báñez’s position is precisely in explaining how efficacious grace preserves the freedom of the will. I recommend listening to Prof. Feingold’s answer to question #5 in the Q&Ahere.

One problem with the Garrigou-Lagrrange quotation in #54 is that if all the persons who received efficacious grace (as conceived in the Báñezian sense) did not retain the power to resist in the very moment in which it was given, the result would be the same. For example, I could also say that when I throw a rock, it could dissent if it willed, and that the power to dissent remains, but that it never wills to dissent. But, of course, the problem is that the result would be the same if the rock had no power of dissent. So LG’s statement seems to be a merely semantic avoidance of the problem.

Another problem with the LG claim is that in the quotation LG seems to think that unless grace were irresistibly efficacious, it would not cause us to act. But that can’t be right, because of the following quadrilemma: Either (1) sufficient grace would not cause us to act, in which case either (a) sufficient grace is truly sufficient, in which case our action to salvation in response to sufficient grace would only our own motion, which would constitute Pelagianism, or (b) sufficient grace is not truly sufficient, Or(2) sufficient grace would cause us to act, in which case either (a) sufficient grace reduces to efficacious grace, which entails either universalism or Calvinism, or (b) sufficient grace is still grace but is not efficacious grace, in which case grace doesn’t have to be irresistibly efficacious in order to cause us to act. But (1a), (1b), and (2a) are problematic, and therefore (2b).

also form comment 89  here  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/do-you-want-to-go-to-heaven/#comment-46915  quoted below:

I’ve been following this conversation and would like to comment on your interpretation of the scripture verses in #88. It seems to me that you are assuming that believers, after they once believe, cannot subsequently reject God and fall away after they once believed. This implies we have freedom until we believe, and we lose that freedom to reject Him after we once believe. But the verses you’re quoting simply don’t say this. Here’s some specifics:

Romans 8:29-30 – Catholics agree that the elect, the chosen, whom He foreknew, will end up in heaven. And with these chosen ones, He predestines, calls, justifies, and glorifies them. But notice that Paul doesn’t say that He glorifies all who are at some point justified, nor does it say He justifies all whom He calls, nor that He glorifies all whom He calls. On the contrary, Jesus says “Many are called, but few are chosen”. Similarly, Catholics believe that it’s possible to lose one’s justification (state of grace) through mortal sin, or the rejection of God. It’s also possible to recover that same justification.

John 10:27 – Catholics agree that He will not allow the sheep (the elect) to be snatched away or lost. But this verse says nothing about the goats in His flock. Note that the goats also call him “Lord” in Matthew 25:44.

2 Cor 12:9 – Catholics agree that We can’t get to heaven without sufficient grace. But sufficient grace does not mean I will for certain go to Heaven, because I can reject His grace. For example, I can have sufficient gas to get to work, but choose not to go to work. The sufficiency of His grace is compatible with our freedom to reject Him at any point along the journey. This is why we can believe that because of His perfect goodness and mercy, He offers _all_ men sufficient grace to get to Heaven.

1 Peter 1 – Catholics agree that God protects us – as long as we have faith. “you, who are protected by the power of God through faith“. Such protection is not guaranteed for those who reject Him and lose faith.

1 Ephesians 1 – The Holy Spirit is indeed a pledge to eternal inheritance, but it is also possible to “resist” the Holy Spirit, or blaspheme against that same Spirit.

When He saves us, He grafts us onto the vine of Christ. But if we don’t “remain” in Him, we wither and die. Dead faith is “dead” precisely because it was once alive, but is no longer so.

Luke 8 – “they believe for a while, but in the time of testing they fall away”
Rev 2:4 – “you have forsaken the love you had at first”.

The tension in this conversation is between God’s will that all men be saved, His sufficient grace which He gives to all men, and the free will which He gives to man to reject Him for some worldly desire which we may come to love more than Him. Rejection of God is possible not because God predestines some to be saved and some to reject Him. Turning our back on Him is possible because God has given all men the freedom to do so. His perfect love for all men, and His will to save all men, is contingent on our freedom to accept that gift of love (cooperate), or reject it. Neither justification, adoption, nor the gift Holy Spirit change this freedom. If freedom is good, then God must want us to have it even as His adopted children. But if freedom is not good, then He would not have given it to us in the first place.

What I would not do is assume you are one of the elect (the sheep). Don’t assume that if you put God to the test and willingly and knowingly disobey Him that He will somehow override your free will and force you to repentance. Rather, “work out your salvation in fear and trembling” , while knowing that nothing can separate you from His love.

good article at the encylopedia:http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htm

an audio --this audio was not really very helpful however  here on Catholic Answers http://www.catholic.com/radio/shows/are-you-predestined-4713#

The limits that the Catholic Church sets for the doctrine are given in the newadvent.org encylopedia article:

Owing to the infallible decisions laid down by the Church, every orthodox theory on predestination and reprobation must keep within the limits marked out by the following theses: (a) At least in the order of execution in time (in ordine executionis) the meritorious works of the predestined are the partial cause of their eterna lhappiness; (b) hell cannot even in the order of intention (in ordine intentionis) have been positively decreed to the damned, even though it is inflicted on them in time as the just punishment of their misdeeds; (c) there is absolutely no predestination to sin as a means to eternal damnation. Guided by these principles, we shall briefly sketch and examine three theories put forward by Catholic theologians.

from an article here  http://vivacatholic.wordpress.com/2007/08/12/predestination-in-catholicism/ the quotes below"

 If God gives His Grace to every one and desires all men to be saved, then why can’t all enter heaven?  Scripture says that God gives His Grace lavishly to the Elect (Ephesians 1:7-8) and He has mercy but also hardens the hearts of whom He will (cf. Romans 9:18).  This is something we cannot question – God is the potter and we are the clay (Romans 9:20-21).  In Catholic Church’s terminology God gives the Elect sufficient and efficacious Grace while the Reprobates receive sufficient but inefficaciousGrace.  Catholics believe God gives everyone sufficient Grace to make him/her, using his/her freedom, turn to God and be saved.  One way to explain it is using Jesus’ parable of the talents (Matthew 25:14-30).  In the parable the Master gave different number of talents to his three servants according to their abilities.  The Master obviously had the right to decide how many talents each servant received. The servant with only one talent was later condemned.  Yet his Master did not intend to condemn him by giving him only one talent.  Had he deposited it in the bank he would be fine like the other two.  The servant was condemned for his own wrong action, i.e. hiding the single talent entrusted to him.  Thus Catholics believe that condemnation of the Reprobate always involves their freedom to reject God’s Grace – in other words they are responsible for their damnation.  Catholic’s view on Reprobation is called as Positive Conditional Reprobation – when God created the world He, being omniscience, foresaw the Reprobate’s rejection to His Grace and let them use their freedom to do so.  Yet God still wants them to be saved and still gives them sufficient Grace.  

“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of ‘predestination’, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace: ‘In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place [Acts 4:27-28]. For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness. 

Catechism of the Catholic Church # 600

Catholics, on the other hand, believe that without God’s Grace we can neither believe in God nor obey His commandments – our salvation is impossible without God’s Grace but we have freedom to cooperate with that Grace or not.

To Calvinists God gives His (saving) Grace only to the Elect who can neither reject nor lose it.   However Jude 4 says that those who were designated for condemnation pervert the Grace of God – something they cannot do if they do not receive it in the first place.  The belief that God gives His Grace only to the Elect was condemned in the Council of Trent.

If any one saith, that the grace of Justification is only attained to by those who are predestined unto life; but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema.

Council of Trent, Canon XVII of the Decrees on Justification

Calvinists may use God’s sovereignty to defend their position.  But here they make presumption, i.e. God first foreordained the Reprobate to eternal damnation when He created the world and because He is sovereign then His will must take place.  Catholics do not deny that God is sovereign but He cannot contradict Himself.   Scripture does say that God through Christ intends to save all mankind (Romans 5:18, 1 Corinthians 15:22, 1 Timothy 1:15, Titus 2:11) – He won’t contradict Himself by, through His decree, foreordaining some (the Reprobate) with no reason to hell....
from a comment on the post:

If you interpret Romans 9:16 to mean God predestines some to hell, you contradict Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22. Scripture would not contradict itself but your interpretation does, unless you fine tune Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22, i.e. to make “all” to mean “all Elect”, which those verses DO NOT say. Catholics and Calvinists believe that the Fall make us born in sinful state – we do not deserve heaven unless God takes the initiative to save us. The initiative does not come from us – we do not have the will to be saved (those who say we do are semi-pelagian which most, if not all Calvinists confuse with synergism). Catholics do not believe all will go to heaven but unlike Calvinists we believe that they (the Reprobate) end-up in hell because they choose so, NOT because God decided not to regenerate them. In Catholicism God offer salvation to ALL and He does predestine the Elect to heaven by giving them sufficient and efficacious grace. God gives the Reprobate sufficient grace but NOT efficacious grace because He has mercy to whom He will and harden whom He will (Romans 9:15). Sufficient grace implies it is the Reprobate to blame for their damnation. Thus Catholics have no problem with Romans 9:15 and we do not need to tune Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22 like Calvinists do. Eph 2:8 is one the most quoted verse to justify faith alone salvation. Catholics do believe that faith is gift from God through His grace who gives it to use NOT because we do something to deserve it.

see his comments section for a lot more!

Matt 23:37“O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!

On the death of Christ comment   209 here:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/#comment-51695

To return to a much earlier analogy in this thread (comments 46-52): I don’t see how Jesus being crucified is different from the video store clerk tasing an innocent person, which you said would be unjust. God is willing and demanding the suffering of an innocent person–what is the difference whether you talk about it as the clerk (or God) “pouring out wrath” or whether you call it the other person (or Jesus) “offering a gift” to the clerk of allowing himself to be tased. It’s the same thing that you’re talking about.

Because God did not crucify His Son anymore than Jesus committed suicide. We killed Jesus. God planned this in accord with our free sinful choices, and allowed His Son to be handed over to be condemned, scourged, crucified, and killed, by us.

You wrote:

Either way, it seems twisted that what pleases the clerk is to see someone get tased. And it seems twisted that what pleases God is to see someone voluntarily suffer and die. Wouldn’t a video store clerk who killed a third party, or who demanded that some third party step in front a train, in order to pay for a late video, be acting unjustly?

Exactly. That’s precisely why it is essential to realize, as St. Peter preaches, that this Man “you nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death”. (Acts 2:23) God’s plan works through our foreseen free choices. Jesus did not commit suicide; He allowed us to kill Him, in order to effect our redemption. Likewise, God the Father did not kill His Son; He allowed us to do so, in order to effect our redemption. It did not please God the Father to hand over His Son to death per se; nor did such a death per se please the Son. Rather, what pleased the Father and the Son was the salvation of the world through the self-giving sacrifice of the Son by the hands of sinful men.


from comment 24 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2014/01/saved-by-love-alone-a-seminary-wifes-journey/#comment-78853

If parents ought not doubt the election of their children (agreed to above), how do you think they should be viewed?

The Catholic doesn’t have this problem, because in Catholic teaching regeneration (which comes through the baptism of the infant) does not entail election-to-glory, and because election-to-glory status is known only to God. Hence the parents make no presumption either way concerning their childrens’ election-to-glory status, just as they make no presumption about their own elect-to-glory status.

Also from comment nine in dealing with God's will and man's will and predestination:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/11/lawrence-feingold-on-gods-universal-salvific-will/#comment-178121
Ken, (re: #8)
You wrote:

Rather, Aquinas believed that what God took into consideration was the greater good of the entire universe. That is to say, the way in which He desired to express His goodness to the fullest extent.

Nothing in the quotation you provided from St. Thomas even mentions antecedent or consequent will. So your claim that for St. Thomas, the distinction between antecedent and consequent will is based on taking into consideration either only the good of the individual (i.e. for the antecedent will) or also the good of the whole universe (i.e. for the consequent will), is an unsubstantiated claim.
Regarding this distinction (between God’s antecedent and consequent will) St. Thomas directly and explicitly ties it to the free choices of creatures, when, in answer to the question “Can the divine will be distinguished into antecedent and consequent?” he writes in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate:

In God’s operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing, matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance with the nature which He previously gave them. And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance with its own capacity.
That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfills in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains to His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfills in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God’s will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God with either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him. (QDV Q.23 a.2)

As St. Thomas explains, that to which God has destined the creature as far as God is concerned, is what is called God’s antecedent will. That’s not limited only to the individual creature’s good, nor does it disregard the common good. Rather, what the antecedent will does not take into consideration is the creature’s free response, as St. Thomas then goes on to explain. Because some persons freely work against their own salvation, and the order of God’s wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation “in view of their failure,” [in view of their sin of freely rejecting grace, they cannot then be saved, given the redemptive economy God has established, by which those who freely and permanently reject grace are allowed to remain in that condition forever] they therefore receive just punishment, because they are the one’s who have damned themselves, by freely and definitively rejecting the grace He offered them.
And for St. Thomas this free choice against God’s antecedent will is precisely the basis for the difference between God’s antecedent and consequent will, the very question St. Thomas is answering in this article. When the creature’s choice diverges from God’s antecedent will, the creature receives God’s secondary intention, or consequent will. For St. Thomas the failure to correspond to the offered grace is neither God’s antecedent will nor His consequent will. Rather, for St. Thomas, this sinful failure (from us) is precisely that by which God’s antecedent will is distinguished from God’s consequent will. Regarding the rejection of grace St. Thomas says something similar in the SCG when he writes:

In fact, as far as He is concerned, God is ready to give grace to all; “indeed He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” as is said in 1 Timothy (2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace. (SCG III. 159)

And in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales St. Thomas writes:

God moves everything according to its manner. So divine motion is imparted to some things with necessity; however, it is imparted to the rational nature with liberty because the rational power is related to opposites. God so moves the human mind to the good, however, that a man can resist this motion. And so, that a man should prepare himself for grace is from God, but that he should lack grace does not have its cause from God but from the man…. (Quodlibetales I. Q.4 a.2 ad 2)

And this fits completely with and explains what St. Thomas says in ST I Q.19 a.6 about the basis for the distinction between antecedent and consequent will.
It would be a mistake to infer from any truth in ST I Q.23 a.5 ad 3 that what St. Thomas says in SCG III.159 and in QDV Q.23 a.2 and in ST I Q.19 a.6 is false. The manifestation of God’s goodness through the creation of free creatures capable of freely sinning and allowed to reject grace freely in an irrevocable, everlasting way does not mean or entail that the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will is not our sins. God’s desire to manifest His goodness most fully through a myriad of grades of being in creatures, thereby including the creation of free creatures capable of sin, does not mean or entail that the creatures’ free choice to reject the grace offered to Him is not the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will. His desire to manifest His goodness through the creation of such creatures makes the distinction possible, but the creatures’ free, sinful choices makes the distinction actual. If every free creature always freely chose to obey God, as Christ in His human will always perfectly obeyed God, there would be no distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will; they would be one and the same.
You concluded:

Thus, to Aquinas, the consequent differed from the anticident will in that the consequent will considered the greater good of the universe.

The problem with that claim is that there is no evidence for it.

It was never the view of Aquinas that God first took into account our cooperation.

The problem with that claim is that what St. Thomas explicitly says directly refutes it.

from comment 23 on this same linked post:

This notion of reprobation is contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church regarding reprobation. According to the Catholic teaching, hell is not positively decreed to the damned, and the reprobate are not predestined to fall into sin as a means to justly deserve hell. The Catholic teaching on reprobation can be seen in the Council of Orange (AD 529):

According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. (Council of Orange)

In this life the power of God does not leave anyone unable to avoid evil or be saved from evil, and thus the grace of God does not leave anyone unable to be saved. The notion that God foreordains anyone to evil by His power, rather than by allowing them to reject grace is anathematized.

This doctrine concerning reprobation can also be seen in the Council of Quiersy (AD 853):

The just and good God, however, chose from this same mass of perdition according to His foreknowledge those whom through grace He predestined to life [ Rom. 8:29 ff.; Eph. 1:11], and He predestined for these eternal life; the others, whom by the judgment of justice he left in the mass of perdition, however, He knew would perish, but He did not predestine that they would perish, because He is just; however, He predestined eternal punishment for them. (Denz. 316)

In other words, though God foreknew that the reprobate would perish, He did not predestine anyone to perish. He predestined a certain punishment [i.e. eternal punishment] for those whom He created for eternal life, but whom He knew would freely choose to reject grace, and whom He permitted to reject grace.

This same Catholic understanding of reprobation can be seen in the Third Council of Valence (AD 855):

Certainly neither (do we believe) that the foreknowledge of God has placed a necessity on any wicked man, so that he cannot be different, but what that one would be from his own will, as God, who knew all things before they are, He foreknew from His omnipotent and immutable Majesty. “Neither do we believe that anyone is condemned by a previous judgment on the part of God but by reason of his own iniquity.” “Nor (do we believe) that the wicked thus perish because they were not able to be good; but because they were unwilling to be good, they have remained by their own vice in the mass of damnation either by reason of original sin or even by actual sin.

[I]n the election, moreover, of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes the merited good. In the condemnation, however, of those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God. In predestination, however, (we believe) that God has determined only those things which He Himself either in His gratuitous mercy or in His just judgment would do …; in regard to evil men, however, we believe that God foreknew their malice, because it is from them, but that He did not predestine it, because it is not from Him. (We believe) that God, who sees all things, foreknew and predestined that their evil deserved the punishment which followed, because He is just, …. “But we do not only not believe the saying that some have been predestined to evil by divine power,” namely as if they could not be different, “but even if there are those who wish to believe such malice, with all detestation,” as the Synod of Orange, “we say anathema to them”. (Denz. 321-22)

Valence clarifies that by “predestined to evil by divine power” the meaning is that the reprobate could not but do evil, i.e. they could not choose to do right. And that entails that sufficient grace is offered to all, even the reprobate.

The Council of Trent likewise condemned double predestination, again with this language of divine power:

If anyone says that the grace of justification is shared by those only who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called are called indeed but receive not grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema. (Session VI, Canon 17)

Here again, the condemned position is one that predestines persons to evil by depriving them of the grace they need in order to obey God.

For Calvin it is false that God truly desires the salvation of all men without exception. But in the Catholic teaching God does desire the salvation of all men without exception; this is why (contra the Jansenists) the Church teaches that Christ died for all men without exception. For Calvin, sufficient grace is not offered to the reprobate, but in Catholic doctrine sufficient grace is offered to all (otherwise, that would be double-predestination). For Calvin, the human will, being dead, does not participate voluntarily in regeneration (Institutes II.3.6), and cannot resist grace; therefore, since universalism is false, double predestination logically follows. But in Catholic doctrine, the will cooperates in regeneration (Council of Trent, VI, Canon 4), and can resist sufficient grace (which is offered to all), and therefore double predestination does not follow. So these are real, substantive differences between Calvin and the Catholic Church on the doctrine of reprobation.

and from comment 23 on same post in answer to the following indented statement:

But Thomas himself isd deliberate is saying that the non-elect is not loved by God.

Except he does not say that. In saying “but He does not wish every good to them all” the “does not wish” refers to the divine plan to allow men freely to reject Him, and to His consequent will which takes into consideration their free rejection of the truly sufficient grace He offers them. Just because for St. Thomas predestination is not based on foreseen merits it does not follow that for St. Thomas the reprobation of any particular individual (as opposed to the divine plan to allow men freely to reject Him) is not based on foreseen rejection of grace.