Molinism

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10437a.htm   This article starts by saying

The name used to denote one of the systems which purpose to reconcile grace andfree will. This system was first developed by Luis de Molina, and was adopted in its essential points by the Society of Jesus. It is opposed by the Thomistic doctrine of grace — the term Thomism has a somewhat wider meaning — whose chief exponent is the Dominican Bañez. Along lines totally different from those of Molina, this subtile theologian endeavours to harmonize grace and free will on principles derived from St. Thomas. Whereas Molinism tries to clear up the mysterious relation between grace and free will by starting from the rather clear concept of freedom, the Thomists, in their attempt to explain the attitude of the will towards grace, begin with the obscure idea of efficacious grace. The question which bothschools set themselves to answer is this: Whence does efficacious grace (gratia efficax), which includes in its very concept the actual free consent of the will, derive its infallible effect; and how is it that, in spite of the infallible efficacy of grace, the freedom of the will is not impaired? It is evident that, in every attempt to solve this difficult problem, Catholic theologians must safeguard two principles: first, the supremacy and causality of grace (against Pelagianism and Semipelagianism), and second, the unimpaired freedom of consent in the will (against early Protestantismand Jansenism). For both these principles are dogmas of the Church, clearly and emphatically defined by the Council of Trent

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-vs-calvinism

Craig writes:

 Actually, I have no problem with certain classic statements of the Reformed view. For example, the Westminster Confession (Sect. III) declares that

God from all eternity did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence offered to the will of creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

Now this is precisely what the Molinist believes! The Confession affirms God’s preordination of everything that comes to pass as well as the liberty and contingency of the creaturely will, so that God is not the author of sin. It is a tragedy that in rejecting middle knowledge Reformed divines have cut themselves off from the most perspicuous explanation of the coherence of this wonderful confession.

read the articles to see what Molinist believe.

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-vs-calvinism#ixzz2W9KvnjR4
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-and-free-will

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/molinism-and-divine-election

http://www.theopedia.com/Molinism  a summation with links

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/middle1.html

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/middle2.html

here is an explanation of it but it is written against it: http://www.ligonier.org/blog/molinism-101/


from here: http://www.theologyforthechurch.com/1/post/2010/04/so-what-is-molinism.html

Named after its first proponent, Luis Molina (1535–1600), a sixteenth-century Jesuit priest, Molinism holds to a strong notion of God’s control and an equally firm affirmation of human freedom. In other words Molinism simultaneously holds to a Calvinistic view of a comprehensive divine sovereignty and to a version of free will (called libertarianism) generally associated with Arminianism. As Doug Geivett argues, the fact that Molinism is the one proposal that tries to hold simultaneously to both is a point in its favor, since both “are prima facie true.”
Molinism teaches that God exercises his sovereignty primarily through his omniscience, and that he infallibly knows what free creatures would do in any given situation. In this way God sovereignly controls all things while humans are also genuinely free. God is able to accomplish his will through the use of what Molinists label his middle knowledge.  We will look at the Molinist model of God’s knowledge and providence in the next chapter and in the chapter on sovereign election.    
So Molinism formulates a radical “compatibilism,”—a “Calvinist” view of divine sovereignty and an “Arminian” view of human freedom—and for this reason is often attacked from both sides of the aisle. Calvinists such as Bruce Ware and Richard Muller consider Molinism to be a type of Arminianism, while Roger Olsen and Robert Picirilli (both card-carrying Arminians) reject Molinism for being too Calvinistic. However, Molinism is attractive to many leading Christian philosophers of our day, such as Alvin Plantinga, Thomas Flint, and William Lane Craig.  One of the main reasons is that it demonstrates it is logically possible to affirm divine sovereignty and human freedom in a consistent manner.  Even open theist William Hasker, who is no friend to Molinism, admits, “If you are committed to a ‘strong’ view of providence, according to which, down to the smallest detail, ‘things are as they are because God knowingly decided to create such a world,’ and yet you also wish to maintain a libertarian conception of free will—if this is what you want, then Molinism is the only game in town.”
As a matter of fact, that is exactly what I want because I believe Molinism is faithful to the biblical witness. The Molinist model is the only game in town for anyone who wishes to affirm a high view of God’s sovereignty while holding to a genuine definition of human choice, freedom and responsibility.  William Lane Craig goes so far as to describe the Molinist notion of middle knowledge as “the single most fruitful theological concept I have ever encountered.”  When we apply Molinism to the vexing questions of predestination and election, the reasons for his enthusiasm become evident. 

From Salvation & Sovereignty pp. 5-6