Free Will--

see also the explanation of Molinism here http://nannykim-catholicconsiderations.blogspot.com/2013/06/molinism.html

 First is the quote from CCC 1731-1732 and then follows an explanation:

“Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.

As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame, merit or reproach. (CCC 1731-1732)

explanation from here:  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/07/a-reply-to-r-c-sproul-regarding-the-catholic-doctrines-of-original-sin-and-free-will/    

Finally, regarding the quotation from the Catechism regarding man’s free will, Sproul’s claim that the Catechism’s statement amounts to Pelagianism is based on Sproul’s not grasping the Catechism’s distinction of nature and grace. The will of fallen man retains the ability to choose between good and evil, but it does not, on its own, have the power to choose man’s supernatural good. Neither actual nor sanctifying grace are necessary to choose between courage and cowardice, between generosity and stinginess, between responsible parenting and neglect of one’s children. We see non-Christians freely choose between these, sometimes rightly sometimes wrongly, on a daily basis. Grace is necessary for choosing and attaining man’s supernatural end. That’s what Pelagianism denies. St. Augustine never denied that pagans have free will to choose between good and evil. Nor did he hold that every action by an unregenerate person was a sin. Rather, he held that persons without actual grace could not choose our supernatural end, and that persons without sanctifying grace could not merit our supernatural end, namely, heaven. Failing to distinguish between nature and grace, and between our natural end and our supernatural end, leads to concluding falsely that affirming fallen man’s ability to choose freely between good and evil is some sort of Pelagianism.

from part of comment 260      here: http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/09/does-the-bible-teach-sola-fide/ ( He is answering a statement which he quotes)

You wrote:

First, Scripture tells us that in the unsaved state, we are slaves to sin. In this state, we have no power over sin and death. Slavery and free will, in my view, are mutually exclusive concepts. Yes a slave may have a free will, but it is trumped by a greater power. Further, in our saved state, we are slaves to Christ and again, the concept of free will seems at odds. We know from Scripture that our natural will is unrighteous (resulted from original sin).

Instead of speaking of Scripture in general, I think it would be more helpful in each case to point to the actual texts of Scripture.

From a Catholic point of view, when St. Paul speaks of the unregenerate as “slaves to sin,” he does not mean that every act they choose is a sin, but that without grace they cannot ultimately avoid committing mortal sin. In this sense they are not free to avoid sin, but are carried along by their own lusts from sin to sin. Conversely, being a slave to righteousness does not mean that one cannot but obey, as though one cannot sin, and has lost the ability to sin. Rather, it means that through love (agape) we now can resist all mortal sin, and are carried by love from righteousness to righteousness, leading to our sanctification. We are compelled by the agape in which there is true freedom, so that although we retain the power to sin, yet in our hearts we desire to please the Lord. In that sense we are not free to sin. Sin is contrary to the agape poured out into our hearts.

All this has to do with our relation to the supernatural, not the natural. In the state of sin, our will is not capable of giving agape to God. Yet our natural freedom remains intact. We can still choose between chocolate and vanilla, or between good and evil (e.g. virtue and vice). But we cannot choose to live in love for God, with the work of grace in our hearts. I recommend listening to minutes 44′ through 51′ of Lawrence Feingold’s lecture on freedom of the will.

from comment 47  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/12/signs-of-predestination-a-catholic-discusses-election/

God made us with free will, because He made us in His own image. Free will is intrinsic to human nature. To lose free will would mean to cease to be human, to cease to be made in His image. So the notion that at the fall Adam and Eve lost free will (without qualification) would entail that at the fall they changed species, falling from human to non-human. And that would have many problematic implications. Through the fall man did not lose free will, but lost the ability to turn to God in filial love, without the gift of actual grace..................

 But He gives to all sufficient grace for salvation, and therefore every man’s choice (whether for or against God) is a free and self-determining choice, not a coerced choice or a choice without the ability to do otherwise....

And that’s what makes Catholic doctrine different from the system of “limited atonement.” It cannot be said truly in the Calvinist doctrine that God loves all men and desires them all to enter freely into eternal friendship with Himself. But, that can be truly said within Catholic doctrine because God gives to all men sufficient grace to do just that. Likewise, given limited atonement, there cannot be an authentic offer of the gospel to the non-elect, since Christ did not die for them. But in Catholic doctrine there is an authentic offer to all men because Christ died for all men and through Christ God gives to every human being sufficient grace to turn to Him in faith and love. No one can say, “I didn’t receive enough grace; there was no way I could have turned to God. Therefore, I am not responsible for not turning to Christ, because I couldn’t have done otherwise.” But given “limited atonement” all the damned could say just that; they were never given a choice between heaven and hell, because the option of choosing heaven was never open to them. In fact, how could such a person be given sufficient reason to love God, if it were true that God made that person for the purpose of burning in hell forever, and refused to give such a person a chance for salvation?

from comment 57 on the above link--this quote is Thomas AQuinas:

“Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is no distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown (Question 22, Art. 3). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination.”

Thomas Aquinas, ST, Ia. Q. 23, a.5.

from comment 59 on the same link:

Regarding freedom, of course I agree with you that man is in bondage to sin apart from grace. There is a distinction between being free in the sense of having free choice, and being free in the sense of being able to walk in the light of agape rather than in the darkness. Those are two different and mutually compatible senses of ‘freedom.’ Freedom in the former sense is intrinsic to man as man. But freedom in the latter sense is a gift of grace. The freedom spoken of in Scripture (especially in the NT) is primarily freedom in the latter sense.

As for whether those who have reached the age of reason freely cooperate in being translated from the state of enmity with God to the state of friendship with God, yes, therein lies an important difference between the Catholic and Reformed paradigms. But I think the distinction between actual grace and sanctifying grace is helpful here; without that distinction the Catholic doctrine seems semi-Pelagian, from the Reformed point of view. But with the distinction the Catholic doctrine avoids both semi-Pelagianism and the monergism of Jansenism. (I’ve explained the distinction between actual grace and sanctifying grace briefly in “A Reply from a Romery Person.”)

If the conjunction of the Catholic doctrines that (a) God desires all men to be saved and (b) God gives sufficient grace to all to be saved and (c) not all are saved seems to you to “destroy God’s ability to accomplish His will” then the Reformed distinction between God’s moral will and His sovereign will also either destroys God’s ability to accomplish His moral will, or it makes God disingenuous in claiming that He truly wants our obedience to His laws. But if the distinction between God’s sovereign will and His moral will doesn’t do either of those two things, then neither do the Catholic doctrines destroy God’s ability to accomplish His will.

end of quote

and St.Thomas:

Although one may neither merit in advance nor call forth divine grace by a movement of his free choice, he is able to prevent himself from receiving this grace: Indeed, it is said in Job(21:34): “Who have said to God: Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Your ways”; and in Job (24:13): “They have been rebellious to the light.” And since this ability to impede or not to impede the reception of divine grace is within the scope of free choice, not undeservedly is responsibility for the fault imputed to him who offers an impediment to the reception of grace. In fact, as far as He is concerned, God is ready to give grace to all; “indeed He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” as is said in 1 Timothy (2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace; just as, while the sun is shining on the world, the man who keeps his eyes closed is held responsible for his fault, if as a result some evil follows, even though he could not see unless he were provided in advance with light from the sun. (SCG III 159)

from comment 172 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/do-you-want-to-go-to-heaven/

There is a good article somewhere on this site that explains the different between God’s absolute will and God’s contingent will. God’s absolute will is irresistible, but things that He contingently wills, He allows to be resisted by freedom. The assumption is that if God wants part of His will to be resistible, He can do that. And this is exactly what He deemed good when it comes to the sufficient grace offered to all men.

Is God as first cause of everything, powerful enough to create humans that are really free? Does his foreknowledge limit His ability to instill true freedom in His creatures?

This is hard for me to understand, because I am a software programmer – the programs I create can only do what I say, these programs are not free to do what they want. But I believe humans are truly free and not software programs. And I have no idea how He accomplished this.

Here’s a good discussion of the theological tensions involved and theological positions that are compatible with the Catholic faith:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/05/predestination-john-calvin-vs-thomas-aquinas/

from comment 173:

This can only mean that He did not want all men to be saved, for if He did, He would not have made His will resistible. This view essentially says that God believed giving man “free will” was more important than saving him… am I right?

from comment 174:

He did not make His grace irresistible because He willed absolutely a good even greater than the good of universal salvation. That good was to create free creatures.

It’s possible to will a greater good absolutely and yet desire a lesser good at the same time (contingent on getting the first good). To create humans that were truly free to love and choose good necessitated that He allow that His will for universal salvation be contingent on this freedom.

To accomplish these prioritized goals, He first gave men freedom, and at the same time gave us a sufficient grace that we might be saved.

If He had absolutely willed for all men to be saved, then He would have lost the greater good of human freedom.

God's permissive will

from comment 180 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/do-you-want-to-go-to-heaven/#comment-50835

As a starting point, while it’s hard to remember as limited human beings, we have to keep in mind that God is not at all like us. The instinct when we see anthropomorphic language in Scripture is to latch onto it and to apply it as if we know God in the same way we would know another human, but that instinct must be avoided. When we speak of God’s “sovereignty” or God’s “purpose” or even God’s “will,” it’s no more literally true of God than saying that God has hands or feet. God as God does not operate in a human way in any sense; these are (poor) analogies that are nonetheless the best we can do.

You appeal to one of those analogies as follows:

The flaw in your argument is the failure to understand God’s “revealed will” as opposed to His “decretive will”. The result of this logic requires God to be subject to fate. Since God created everything, this obviously cannot be, as fate itself was created by God.

This is, I would submit, an anthropomorphism of what is otherwise a helpful analogy. Clasically, there is no distinction between God’s “revealed will” and God’s “decretive will.” That was an invention of the Reformation by analogy to human beings, and it is simply inapplicable to God; God only has a single, perfect will that cannot be divided. The Scholastic distinction, which instead draws distinctions with respect to God’s effects, is the appeal to God’s “permissive will,” and this distinction was rooted solely in the Biblical and philosophical fact that God cannot sin. As St. Thomas succinctly says, “God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.” That does not create a (false) separation in the will of God; instead, it says something about the existence of created things (and in this case, evil in created things) relative to God’s eternal will.

So just as when we see Scriptures describing God’s hands and feet as not being literal, we have to do the same when God is described as actively or positively causing evil. God isn’t surprised by evil either, but He “plans around” it by willing good to come of it rather. To say that God positively wills evil goes beyond a “hard teaching” over to blasphemy, although I recognize that you would not intend it that way. We have to stop short at that point. 

Another quote from St Thomas:

Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of “operating grace.” But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of “cooperating grace.” Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above (Question 17, Article 9) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: “He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect.” And thus if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. (ST I-II Q.111 a.2)

and

Reply to Objection 2. God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God’s justification [justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.
Reply to Objection 3. One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us. (ST I-II Q.111 a.2)

and

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. (ST I Q.83 a.1)

and

Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. (ST I Q.83 a.1)

and

I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. (ST I Q.22 a.4)

and

The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency. (ST I Q.22 a.4)

and

That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking “necessary” and “contingent” are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. (ST I Q.22 a.4)

someone was commenting on the above quotes and arguing against a certain kind of free will here comment 329 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/09/why-protestantism-has-no-visible-catholic-church/  if you look around these comments you will see the different arguments--here is one response to all of the arguments:

Actually, you’re begging two distinct questions.
The first is whether St. Thomas Aquinas’ account of free will is compatibilist and, for that and other reasons, essentially the same as that of the WCF and Jonathan Edwards. Admittedly, you have tried to present an argument to that effect. It consists essentially in supplying pertinent quotations from the sources in question and then asserting that the sources all mean essentially the same thing. But you have presented no rebuttal of the many scholars who interpret Aquinas otherwise. For my own part, I would deny that Aquinas is either a compatibilist like Edwards or a libertarian like Molina. A good argument for my position can be found here. Unless and until you engage such arguments, your interpretation of Aquinas begs the question.
The other question you’re begging is that of the very nature of causality. As I interpret your position, you’re assuming two things:
(1) Events, including free choices, are explicable only in terms of their prior causes
and
(2) A cause or chain of causes C explains its effect D only if C necessitates D.
Now if both (1) and (2) are true, it follows that
(3) Any free action F that’s explicable is necessitated by F’s prior causes.
Now (3) is, itself, a key corollary of compatibilism. But neither (1) nor (2) can be taken for granted; many philosophers–including the ones you’re disputing with here–would deny them. They need to be argued for. But you do not argue for them. You simply take them for granted.

and from a comment    30          here  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/10/protestant-objections-to-the-catholic-doctrines-of-original-justice-and-original-sin/#comment-108835  (go to the  link to the bottom of the comment to see the video---but here is the comment:)

Just about everything Sproul says in the video below (titled “A Divided Will”) in criticism of Catholic doctrine indicates either an unawareness of, or a question-begging presupposition against, the Catholic understanding of the difference between nature and grace. He presupposes a Reformed conception of nature/grace, and then uses that conception as the basis for his criticisms, not realizing (apparently) the paradigmatic nature of the difference between the Reformed and Catholic theological positions. So, for example, in the 8th minute of the video he completely misses the distinction between actual grace and sanctifying grace, thereby confusing what Trent is saying about actual grace as though it is talking about justifying grace. (On this distinction see “Lawrence Feingold on Sanctifying Grace and Actual Grace.” See also my “A Reply from a Romery Person.”) He treats as an ‘ambiguity’ what is clear in light of the Tradition, that the “grace 0f justification” is the grace received at the moment of baptism.

By presupposing the Reformed conception of nature/grace, Sproul simply begs the question (i.e. presupposes precisely what is in question) regarding the possibility of assenting and cooperating with actual grace. The nature/grace paradigm difference is what underlies the monergism/synergism question. Sproul, however, treats the monergism question as settled by what it means to be “dead in sins,” not realizing (apparently) that what it means to be “dead in sins” depends precisely on the nature/grace question. For this reason his criticisms presuppose precisely what is in question, because he fails to see that his premises presuppose the truth of the Reformed paradigm.

The same is true of his criticisms of the Church’s condemnations of the errors of Michael du Bay, and Cornelius Jansen toward the end of the video. In each case, Sproul presupposes the Reformed conceptions of nature and grace, and thus begs the question. He treats the infallibility of God’s election as entailing the irresistibility of divine grace, an inference St. Augustine did not make. He claims that the Catholic Church has contradicted herself on this question (by ruling out at one time or other every available option), but then never actually lays out the alleged contradiction, and so conveniently leaves his accusation as a mere unsubstantiated assertion.

At the end of his lecture, he criticizes the Catholic Catechism’s teaching on free will:

Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude. As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame, merit or reproach. (CCC 1731-32)

Sproul claims (24′) that because the Catholic Church teaches that man, after the fall, still retains the power to choose between good and evil, therefore the Catholic Church’s position is Pelagian. But the relevant question in the Pelagian dispute was not whether post-fall man could choose between good and evil, but whether man could, without grace, never sin, and so merit heaven. Neither Pelagius nor St. Augustine claimed that fallen man could not choose between good and evil. St. Augustine was not unaware that even unregenerate fathers provide for their children, and their mothers care for them, even to the point of death, and that the civil authority could justifiably enjoin its citizens to keep the law, and justifiably punish those who disobeyed it, because they could have chosen otherwise. All of that is at the level of nature, not grace. (See “Did the Council of Trent Contradict the Second Council of Orange?“) These good acts are not sins, but neither are they meritorious, because they are not done from grace and divinely infused agape. Sproul’s claim that Catholic teaching on free will is “Pelagian” is thus not only false, but presupposes the Reformed conception of nature/grace, and thus presupposes precisely what is in question. In this way it fails to recognize the paradigmatic nature of the dispute.