contradictions?

http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2013/10/on-religious-liberty-an-objection-considered/http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2013/10/on-religious-liberty-an-objection-considered/

also

http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=8779

The above link deals with [quote]--

To be specific, the Lefebvrites insist that theDeclaration on Religious Liberty contradicts what they call infallible teachings of Pius IX found inQuanta cura and the Syllabus of Errors. They often point also to Gregory XVI's Mirari vos.These claims can be answered, but a preliminary point should first be made.

The article above gives very good discussion and details on the subject.  Then this one is particularly good:
http://www.firstthings.com/article/2012/07/conscience-and-coercion

"The declaration is not a statement about religious liberty in general but about a specifically civil liberty: religious liberty in relation to the state and other civil institutions. It does not oppose religious coercion in general, but coercion by the state. The state is forbidden to coerce in matters of religion, not because such coercion is illicit for any authority whatsoever, but because such coercion lies beyond the state’s particular competence. "

also Brian Harrison’s work on reconciling pre-Vat2 and Vat2 on the issue of religious liberty? Many of his articles are online at http://www.rtforum.org/lt/ – you may be interested in
http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt44.html
http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt9.html#II
http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt119.html
http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt151.html
Also in comment 85 here:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2013/10/on-religious-liberty-an-objection-considered/#comment-78258
 In the same speech, Benedict XVI applied the «hermeneutic of reform in the continuity» precisely to the controversial question of religious liberty. The Pope admitted that there is «some kind of discontinuity» in the Catholic teaching about this issue from Pius IX to the Council. Once the correct hermeneutic is applied, however, we may conclude that there is no rupture. The general principles taught by the Church have not changed. Their applications have changed, also as a consequence of new and different historical situations. The liberalism of the French Revolution considered religious freedom as a philosophical doctrine, implying that all religions are equal and that religious truth is merely subjective. This notion of religious freedom was rightly condemned by Pius IX, the Pope said, and the Church cannot accept it even today. «If religious freedom, the Pope explained, were to be considered an expression of the human inability to discover the truth and thus become a canonization of relativism, then this social and historical necessity is raised inappropriately to the metaphysical level and thus stripped of its true meaning. Consequently, it cannot be accepted by those who believe that the human person is capable of knowing the truth about God and, on the basis of the inner dignity of the truth, is bound to this knowledge».

However, the meaning of religious liberty derived from the French Revolution is not the only possible meaning. «The American Revolution, the Pope argued, was offering a model of a modern State that differed from the theoretical model with radical tendencies that had emerged during the second phase of the French Revolution». Thus, the Second Vatican Council proclaimed the right to religious liberty not at a «metaphysical level», but «as a need that derives from human coexistence» within the context of the modern secular State. The Pope did not claim that there is a literal continuity between Pius IX and Dignitatis Humanae. Obviously, there is not. But he did argue that the discontinuity concerned the application of the principles, «the practical forms that depend on the historical situation and are therefore subject to change», while there was continuity at the more crucial level of «the principles that express the permanent aspect». This «combination of continuity and discontinuity» is precisely a clear example of a «reform in the continuity», as opposed to a rupture.

http://www.cesnur.org/2011/dan-mi.html

see also: https://www.ewtn.com/library/ANSWERS/FR89103.HTM

and http://www.catholicworldreport.com/Item/1883/vatican_ii_and_religious_liberty.aspx#.Uxdiu_mYLw9  
 To this, the Council Fathers say that while the State must “take account of religious life,” it would “clearly transgress the limits set to its power, were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are religious.”

This language in article three of Dignitatis Humanae was changed in nearly every draft of the document. The 19th-century popes taught that the State could inhibit public acts of religion. To avoid a direct contradiction, the Council Fathers argued that the State could not presume to inhibit such acts as if it were the arbiter of the true religion. The State could only inhibit religious acts if those acts violated public order and thus the common good.

.......................

Dignitatis Humanae’s definition of religious liberty at the start has it that “all men are to be immune from coercion…, within due limits.” That last phrase is most important, for here the Council Fathers had to walk a very narrow line. Article seven of the document starts to unpack the meaning.

Pope Leo XIII criticized the notion that citizens could worship whatever and however they wanted just so long as “public peace” wasn’t disturbed. In other words, condemned is the notion that you’re free to say and do and believe whatever you want so long as you don’t prohibit another from saying and doing and believing what they want. That was too low a bar for Pope Leo.

He taught that the common good should be the standard for State intervention. Practically, this meant that even if no public peace has been violated, the State may at times repress error to maintain the common good. 

Some argue that because the phrase “common good” is replaced with “public order” there is a contradiction. But the drafters had a good reason to avoid using “common good.” Bishop Emile de Smedt, the official spokesperson for the drafters, argued that the term was not used by modern governments. So the drafters chose “public order” as “the more basic component of the common good” but were careful to define “public order” to include not just “public peace” but “public morality.”

This was still not satisfactory to some. Archbishop Karol Wojtyła—later Pope John Paul II—noted that the Communists appealed to the “public order” all the time as they suppressed and persecuted the Church. He insisted that a reference be made to an objective moral standard. As a result, the drafters decided to define “public order” as the “objective moral order.”

Therefore, according to the declaration and in line with Pope Leo XIII, a right to religious liberty is necessary for the common good, but if one were going to limit religious liberty one would have to demonstrate that the religion was violating the objective moral order.

 Jimmy Aiken's article  here: http://web.archive.org/web/20110911193031/http://www.catholic.com/thisrock/2001/0109bt.asp