There is a difference between the guilt of sin and the debt of punishment for sin. (See the two paragraphs under the heading “Effects of Sin” at the Catholic Encyclopedia article on Sin.) As I explained in comment #157 of the “Imputation and Paradigms” post, debt is relational, while guilt is internal. But debt cannot be cancelled so long as the person is still in sin, because if a person is still in sin, then He is still contributing to the debt. That is why God cannot declare him to be debt-free, so long as he is continuing to add to the debt. The person must no longer be contributing to the debt, in order to be forgiven. Hence the requirement of repentance for forgiveness. Righteousness likewise is internal. The souls of the faithful who died before Christ’s sacrifice were righteous, but they could not enter heaven, because their debt had not yet been covered by Christ’s sacrifice. The canceling of debt is something that depends on inward renewal (for the reason just explained) but is in itself external, because it is relational [as is any debt], whereas the infusion of sanctifying grace and agape is internal.
also from comment 60 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/04/st-paul-on-justification/
The guilt of sin is an intrinsic disorder of the will. Forgiveness of sin ‘obliterates’ the disorder in the will. It is not a change in God (who is immutable), but in the one forgiven. The culpa of sin is the disorder of the sinful act. But the reatus culpa [i.e. guilt] is the disorder in the will, and remains until the person is forgiven. And that in turn is distinct from the reatus poena (i.e. debt of punishment) that also remains after the act, until the debt is forgiven or paid.
and from comment 192 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/ :
Guilt is an intrinsic disorder of the will. The reatus culpa [i.e. guilt] is the disorder in the will, and remains until the person is forgiven, by way of the reordering of the will back to God in love. And the reatus culpa is distinct from the reatus poena (i.e. debt of punishment) that also remains after the act, until the debt is forgiven or paid. The newborn infant, prior to baptism, has neither reatus culpa nor reatus poena. Rather, he lacks sanctifying grace and charity. That’s just what original sin is, namely, the absence of the original justice Adam and Eve had through sanctifying grace and charity. (See “Lawrence Feingold on Original Justice and Original Sin.”)
Swapping sins and obedience between persons is something that God cannot do, because sins and obedience do not exist separately from persons, like a ball or a rock that can be passed around, or even like a body part that can be transplanted. A sin is necessarily an act of a particular person, and therefore always remains essentially the act of this particular person. Tom’s sin can never become Bob’s sin. They may both commit the same type of sin, and Tom’s sin can be the occasion for or provocation of Bob’s sin. But necessarily Tom’s sin will always be Tom’s sin, just as his birth will always be his birth, and his death will always be his death, and not someone else’s death.
The guilt of sin is not a generic disorder in the will; rather, it is essentially an internalization of the disorder of the act of sin against the Power (i.e. God) by which it was created and to which it is ordered, into the power by which the act was done (i.e. the will), by the person’s doing of that disordered act through that power. This is why God cannot even implant guilt within a person without that person sinning, nor can God create a person already having guilt, and not having sinned. Any unwilled disorder would be extrinsic disorder (i.e. extrinsic to the will), and thus not guilt. To be guilt, the disorder must be willed disorder.
So for Christ to have guilt, Christ”s human will would have to be turned away from God by loving something other than God more than God. And this turning away would have to be willed by Christ’s human will. In other words, Christ would have to sin. As long as Christ’s human will retained love for God above all things, then He remained guiltless, free of guilt from any wrongful act by Him or anyone else. So if His will remained ordered to God in love, then He did not become guilty of anyone’s sins. But if His will became disordered, this disorder would be guilt (and not merely a disorder extrinsic to His will) only if He willed against God’s will, i.e. only if He sinned.
So, your dilemma only has force if you can show that the imputation of guilt is metaphysically impossible or morally unjust. This will be a difficult task considering that the Catholic position asserts all mankind was implicated in Adam’s sin, and thus all men are born with a guilty status even before they commit actual sin. If God deals with humanity in this way, then it seems guilty statuses are not the rigid, nontransferable conditions that your dilemma requires.
You’ve misrepresented the Catholic position. The Catholic position is not that the rest of mankind is “implicated in Adam’s sin” or that each descendant of Adam is “born with a guilty status.” No one is born guilty. Rather, as I explained above, children are conceived and born in original sin, i.e. without sanctifying grace and without agape. But that absence of sanctifying grace and agape is not guilt. See “Aquinas and Trent: Part 7,” in which I lay out Trent’s teaching on original sin.
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But then 194 asks the following questions:
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But then 194 asks the following questions:
Bryan (re: #192),
You wrote:
You wrote:
You’ve misrepresented the Catholic position. The Catholic position is not that the rest of mankind is “implicated in Adam’s sin” or are “born with a guilty status.” No one is born guilty. Rather, as I explained above, children are conceived and born in original sin, i.e. without sanctifying grace and without agape. But that absence of sanctifying grace and agape is not guilt.
Yet, when I looked at the article you linked, I found statements like this:
If anyone denies that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, or says that the whole of that which belongs to the essence of sin is not taken away, but says that it is only canceled or not imputed, let him be anathema.
Commenting on that anathema, you explain that:
In this fifth paragraph the Council first condemns two errors. The first is the error of denying that by the grace of Christ which is conferred at baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted.
You also say in comment #5 of that article:
But if we do not have the grace that comes through baptism, then we not only have concupiscence, but we also have objective guilt, i.e. culpability before God, not being clothed with righteousness, but being unrighteous by original sin or actual mortal sin.
You then say also in comment #19 of that article:
But the absence of sanctifying grace in an infant is not guiltless, not because the infant lacking sanctifying grace committed an actual sin, but because no one can enter into eternal life without sanctifying grace and agape.
Obviously, you are not affirming the imputation of the guilt of Adam’s sin to all men. However, you do seem to affirm that all men are born guilty before God in some sense. So, I am a little unclear on your position, especially regarding the statement that comes next:
This is why God cannot even implant guilt within a person without that person sinning, nor can God create a person already having guilt, and not having sinned. Any unwilled disorder would be extrinsic disorder (i.e. extrinsic to the will), and thus not guilt. To be guilt, the disorder must be willed disorder.
Do infants have “objective” guilt before God or not?
Last, I will respond to your comment that
Last, I will respond to your comment that
The guilt of sin is not a generic disorder in the will; rather, it is essentially an internalization of the disorder of the act of sin against the Power (i.e. God) by which it was created and to which it is ordered, into the power by which the act was done (i.e. the will), by the person’s doing of that disordered act through that power.
This is a restatement of your position that guilt can only be acquired through the commission of disordered acts. I agree that this is ordinarily the case. However, there have been two extraordinary men in history (Adam and Jesus) who were united to their offspring in such a way as to allow for the transfer of their respective guilty statuses. You have not proven that guilty statuses are non-transferrable between persons who are united.
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the next comment:
The term ‘guilt’ (in English) has a strict sense and a looser sense by analogy. In the strict sense it refers to the reatus culpa, i.e. the disorder in the will resulting from actual sin. In the looser sense by analogy it refers to the disorder [relative to this economy of salvation, in which God has called us to a supernatural end] of not having sanctifying grace and agape. This is the “reatum originalis peccati” referred to by the fifth session of Trent which is translated into English as ‘guilt.’ And that distinction in senses of the terms explains the quotations you cite, because they are referring only to the absence of sanctifying grace and agape.
You wrote:
So, I am a little unclear on your position, especially regarding the statement that comes next:This is why God cannot even implant guilt within a person without that person sinning, nor can God create a person already having guilt, and not having sinned. Any unwilled disorder would be extrinsic disorder (i.e. extrinsic to the will), and thus not guilt. To be guilt, the disorder must be willed disorder.Do infants have “objective” guilt before God or not?
No, they do not, because they do not have the reatus culpa, i.e. the disorder in the will resulting from actual sin. They have only the absence of sanctifying grace and agape, and the disorder of lower desires which is concupiscence proper.
Last, I will respond to your comment thatThe guilt of sin is not a generic disorder in the will; rather, it is essentially an internalization of the disorder of the act of sin against the Power (i.e. God) by which it was created and to which it is ordered, into the power by which the act was done (i.e. the will), by the person’s doing of that disordered act through that power.This is a restatement of your position that guilt can only be acquired through the commission of disordered acts.
It is not a “restatement;” it is an explanation of what guilt is. Because of what guilt is, it cannot be transferred from one person to another. Guilt is not just a disorder of the will in opposition to God, but is essentially the disorder remaining in the will, of the disordered act of *that* will. This is precisely why we are not guilty for other people’s sinful acts. If you think that guilt can be transferred, then you’ll need to show why guilt is something other than what I’ve said.
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