- For additional reading on the Catholic understanding of the atonement see Philippe De La Trinitaté’s What is Redemption?, and Jean Rivière’s The Doctrine of the Atonement Volume 1 and Volume 2. [↩]
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/
see also http://nannykim-catholicconsiderations.blogspot.com/2012/11/atonementforgivenesmasssalvationtempora.html
see: http://catholicdefense.blogspot.com/2013/03/how-does-good-friday-work-exactly.html
from comment 140 here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/
What people fail to grasp is that Christ does not bear the punishment due to sin in the same manner that sinners do in this life, and will do eternally in hell. Christ bore the punishment due to sin as an act of sacrifice and obedience to the Father’s will. It is not the receiving of God’s wrath that makes the atonement satisfactory (as a substitute punishment), rather it is the Son’s offering up the gift of his blood (his life) on the altar of the cross that atones for human transgression. He suffers in our place as the act of an obedient servant, not as the recipient of wrath from an angry deity. It is not the punishment itself that satisfies divine wrath, but Christ’s humility, obedience, and sacrificial compliance with God’s will that his blood be poured out on the altar of the cross.
The modern evangelical model of penal substitution (not exactly the same as the view of Calvin by the way) severs the link between the incarnation and the cross. The humility and suffering of the Son on our behalf does not begin on the cross, but encompasses his whole incarnate experience. It begins with Jesus’ birth and culminates with his sacrifice at Calvary. It is all of one piece; his unspeakable condescension in setting aside his heavenly glory and becoming one with his fallen creation.
below from comment 148ff here : http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/#comment-45781
a question:
also here is a quote reference is at bottom:
He properly atones for [satisfacit] an offense who offers something which the offended loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above (Question 46, Article 6). And therefore Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 John 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”19 [t.aquinus
[Bryan discusses the aspects of the atonement from Aquinas' view--merit, satisfaction, sacrifice,redemption--go to the link]a question:
"Colossians 2:13-14 says: And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross. (ESV)
I was wondering how a Catholic would think about Jesus nailing the “record of debt” to the cross. What does that mean?
Also, I don’t understand how this works in terms of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and need for confession post-initial-justification in Catholic theology. How could our debt for sin be canceled, but not all our past/present/future sins forgiven at the moment of our initial justification? How does that work?"
[answers 149]
"You said: “How could our debt for sin be canceled, but not all our past/present/future sins forgiven at the moment of our initial justification? How does that work?”
As a former Calvinist, I think I understand Limited Atonement sufficiently. And even within that paradigm, we can roughly distinguish between the event of the atonement and then an application (of sorts) later. Whether “accepting Christ”, or baptism, the Lords Supper, “having faith” or whatever, most Protestants have no trouble seeing the application of the atonement as occurring after the historical event, while in another sense seeing the work of the atonement having already been done. Catholicism is no different in this regard.
I just wanted to point out that Protestants would seem be open to the same question you present."
I just wanted to point out that Protestants would seem be open to the same question you present."
[answer150]
"Concerning that passage in Colossians, St. Thomas writes:
How did Christ cancel this bond? On the cross, for this he set aside, nailing it to the cross. It was the custom for a bond to be torn up once a person had fulfilled all his obligations. Now man was in sin and Christ paid for this by his suffering: “What I did not steal must I now restore?” (Ps 69:4). And therefore, at the moment of Christ’s death this bond was canceled and destroyed. And so he says, this he set aside, nailing it to the cross, by which he took away our sin by making satisfaction to God.
So Christ cancels the bond against us, nailing it to the cross, as it were, by making satisfaction to God through His death on the cross.
Also, I don’t understand how this works in terms of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and need for confession post-initial-justification in Catholic theology. How could our debt for sin be canceled, but not all our past/present/future sins forgiven at the moment of our initial justification? How does that work?
Precisely because it is an atonement by satisfaction, and not by God the Father getting out all His retributive wrath for all the sins of the elect, on His Son on the cross. That is, the reason this is puzzling to you is because you’re still thinking in terms of atonement-by-divine-retribution, rather than atonement-by-satisfaction. In the atonement-by-divine-retribution-on-Christ concept, the penalty for all the sins of the elect (past sins, present sins, and all future sins) is received from the Fathers by Christ on the cross. So there is no point even asking God to forgive your sins, not only afteryou have come to faith, but even the first time you hear the Protestant gospel. The Protestant gospel message, on that notion, is the claim that your sins (past, present, and future) are all already forgiven, because the punishment for them was was already received by Christ on the cross.
In the Catholic doctrine of the atonement as satisfaction, by contrast, Christ by His sacrifice merited superabundant grace for us. And we receive this sanctifying grace through the sacraments. Our sins are forgiven only when we receive this grace. This takes place through baptism, in which we are united to Christ, and conformed to His death on the cross. So at baptism all our past sins are forgiven, but not future sins, because we retain the potential to commit mortal sins, and thereby drive sanctifying grace from our soul. In the sacrament of penance, likewise, our past sins (committed since our baptism or since last reception of the sacrament of confession) are forgiven. So the cancelling of the debt is accomplished by the satisfaction of Christ’s sacrifice though which grace is merited for us, but is applied to us through the sacraments.
A person cannot be simultaneously forgiven and at enmity with God:
[B]y sinning a man offends God as stated above (Question 71, Article 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace. (Summa Theologica I-II Q.113 a.2)
It is not God that changes, when a man is forgiven. It is the man that changes.
As Trent Session Six (chapter 7) teaches, Christ’s sacrifice is the “meritorious cause” of our justification (because He merited the grace by which we are forgiven), and baptism is the instrumental cause, by which this grace is applied to us. So these two causes are not independent of each other; one does not make the other superfluous. The sacraments have their efficacy through Christ’s sacrifice, and we receive the benefits of Christ’s sacrifice through the sacraments."
This is very helpful too--here: http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/04/aquinas-and-trent-part-6/#comment-46122also here is a quote reference is at bottom:
St. Thomas Aquinas---Why Christ's passion is proper
Part III, Question 49 of the Summa. He explains in one of his responses that the Passion is atoning precisely because love atones for sins, and the Cross is the greatest possible act of love:
“I answer that, Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity, because, as the Apostle says (Romans 5:8): “God commendeth His charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us.” But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our sins, according to Luke 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much.” Secondly, Christ’s Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ. Thirdly, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.”
“I answer that, Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity, because, as the Apostle says (Romans 5:8): “God commendeth His charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us.” But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our sins, according to Luke 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much.” Secondly, Christ’s Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ. Thirdly, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.”
Aquinas begins here by explaining the meaning of satisfaction. A person makes proper satisfaction for an offense by offering to the offended something that the offended person loves equally or even more than he detested the offense. By giving Himself over to suffering, in love and obedience for the Father, Christ offered to the Father something that the Father loves far more than He detests all the sins of the human race. Why was Christ’s gift so greatly loved by the Father? Because of the greatness of the charity out of which Christ suffered, the great dignity of what He laid down in love for the Father, and the immensity of the grief He endured, which was far greater interiorly than all His bodily suffering.20 How do we benefit from Christ’s satisfaction? Aquinas writes:
The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members.21
Aquinas sums up the four ways in which Christ’s Passion brought salvation to us, writing:
Christ’s Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ’s soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered as being within Christ’s very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice ….”29
On account of the will of Christ’s soul, His Passion acts by way of merit. On account of the flesh of Christ’s body, His Passion acts by way of satisfaction (inasmuch as by it we are liberated from the debt of punishment), by way of redemption (inasmuch as it frees us from the servitude of guilt [servitute culpae]), and by way of sacrifice (inasmuch as by it we are reconciled to God)."
also from the same link
If Christ through His Passion made satisfaction sufficient for the sins of every human being who has ever lived and will live, why then is not every human person saved? Aquinas writes:
It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to John 3:19: “The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light”), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Romans 5:15-16): “But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification.”38
Here Aquinas explains that Christ came into this world to remove both original sin and all actual sins. Not all sins are removed, he says, because men do not adhere [non inhaerent] to Christ. They choose darkness rather than Christ the light who has come into the world. Christ offered Himself up to the Father on behalf of all men, but if men reject Christ, then they are not united to Christ, and so do not partake of the salvific benefits procured by Christ’s Passion. Only by union with Christ do we participate in the salvific benefits of His Passion.
also from comment 5
Why is it unjust to give someone something they requested?
We have to distinguish between will and nature. Just because someone requests something (with his will), does not mean that it is just to give it to him (given his nature). Whether or not it is just to give it to him depends upon what he asks for, and his nature. Socrates gives the example of a man from whom you have borrowed a knife. Normally, it is just to give back to someone what you have borrowed from that person. But this knife-owner comes to your front-door in a raging fury, say, having just caught his wife in an act of adultery, and demanding back his knife. Should you give it to him? No, not at that moment. Why? Because of his emotional state. It would be unjust to give him back his knife at that moment. So according to his will (i.e. his request) it might seem you should give it back to him, but given his state, you should definitely not give it to him. A person can request something that you should not give to him. All sorts of sexual examples come to mind. Anyone who thinks that a request is sufficient to make fulfilling that request just, should not walk through a red light district. Consent does not entail a moral green light, because consent is not sufficient. The notion that consent is sufficient is a kind of Kantianism that prescinds from the natures of the persons involved, and from the order of Divine justice.
First, from the perspective of the parent it isn’t unjust to him because he requested it.
That’s Kantianism. When Saul asked his armor bearer to kill him, the armor bearer rightly refused. (1 Sam 31:4) It would have been unjust for the armor bearer to kill Saul, even though Saul was requesting it. (You can think of other ‘assisted suicide’ cases.) We have to distinguish between will and nature, and the role each plays in the morality of an action.
To punish an innocent person, knowing that he is innocent, is unjust, whether or not the person *wills* that he be punished. Giving to someone more good than he is due, is compatible with justice because justice does not restrict mercy. But, giving to someone less good (or more evil) than he is due is not compatible with justice. And what he is due is not based only on what he requests. Therefore, punishing an innocent person, knowing that he is innocent, is unjust, whether or not the person *wills* that he be punished.
A parent could justly be punished for a child’s crimes only insofar as the parent was responsible for the child’s evil behavior. With regard to punishment, justice doesn’t merely demand that *someone* be punished, but that the guilty person be punished. Otherwise justice is blind not merely in the proper sense of being impartial, but in the sense of treating humanity as an indefinite amorphous mass deserving some magnitude of blind fury. But on the Day of Judgment, what is presented is not the total debt due for all men’s sins. Rather, the Just Judge judges according to each man’s works. In other words, justice ‘sees’ each man, and what he deserves. Justice does not vent wrath blindly, as though anyone could jump in to block the blind stream of wrath.
To summarize, there are three separate arguments that have been presented for the impossibility of such a guilt transfer, any of which suffice to defeat the Reformed view:
1. Guilt, as a defect of the will, is not a type of metaphysical entity that can be transferred.
2. It is metaphysically impossible for Christ to be rightfully or truly described as guilty, since He is God.
3. If the Reformed theory of the atonement were true, efficacious atonement would not be possible.
1. Guilt, as a defect of the will, is not a type of metaphysical entity that can be transferred.
2. It is metaphysically impossible for Christ to be rightfully or truly described as guilty, since He is God.
3. If the Reformed theory of the atonement were true, efficacious atonement would not be possible.
The last argument proceeds as follows:
1. Either Christ was guilty or Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice.
2. If Christ was guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then He was not innocent.
3. A sacrifice must be innocent to be efficacious.
4. Therefore, if Christ was guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then His sacrifice was not efficacious.
5. If Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then His sacrifice could be efficacious.
6. But if Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then He could not bear the guilt according to the Reformed theory of the atonement.
7. Therefore, for the sacrifice to be efficacious, the Reformed theory of the atonement cannot be true (from 4, 5, and 6).
1. Either Christ was guilty or Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice.
2. If Christ was guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then He was not innocent.
3. A sacrifice must be innocent to be efficacious.
4. Therefore, if Christ was guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then His sacrifice was not efficacious.
5. If Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then His sacrifice could be efficacious.
6. But if Christ was not guilty at the time of the sacrifice, then He could not bear the guilt according to the Reformed theory of the atonement.
7. Therefore, for the sacrifice to be efficacious, the Reformed theory of the atonement cannot be true (from 4, 5, and 6).
I don’t see how any of 1-7 can be disputed. 1 is the law of non-contradiction, leading to either 2 or 5. 3 is a premise you accept. 6 is the definition of the Reformed theory of the atonement. 4 and 7 necessarily follow. That’s a valid a sound argument.
from comment 51 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/12/signs-of-predestination-a-catholic-discusses-election/
If Jesus is a Savior who saves by offering an atonement that atones, then how can we say that his atonement could potentially atone for the sins of no one, or that his salvific work could potentially save nobody?
The question presupposes a different paradigm regarding what the atonement is. (see “Catholic and Reformed Conceptions of the Atonement.”) Christ by his passion and death has atoned for the sins of the whole world. It would be false to say that His atonement could “potentially atone for the sins of no one.” It has already atoned for all the sins of everyone. This is why it is true that whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, because Christ has already made atonement for their sins. This is the good news. But if we reject it, we bring damnation on ourselves, by rejecting the gift of eternal life offered to us in Christ. The reason that doesn’t make sense in a Reformed paradigm, is because the atonement is conceived as God punishing our sin in Christ. So if the sin is already punished, then it can’t be punished again, and therefore if Christ died for everyone then universalism is true, and if Christ died for a subset, then not one of them can go to hell.
But as I explained in “Catholic and Reformed Conceptions of the Atonement,” that’s not the Catholic conception of the atonement. It is not one of God punishing our sins by punishing Christ for them, but of Christ making a sacrifice of love to the Father, and thus giving to the Father something far more pleasing than all our sins are displeasing, such that man is now under the grace of God. But if someone rejects Christ, then that person gets what he has chosen, and that’s not double-jeopardy, because his sin was not already punished in Christ; it was already atoned for by Christ’s sacrifice. But atonement is not punishment.
I am sure that the answer is that the only way the Calvinist could ever swallow the Catholic pill is by first completely abandoning his entire paradigm and adopting a new one, but that’s easier said than done. Especially when we read that Jesus “shall save his people from their sins,” and that “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners.”
Yes, the paradigm switch is not easy, especially if the Calvinist paradigm is deeply ingrained. The difficulty is not so much comparing the other paradigm, as seeing the other paradigm. So, can the Catholic paradigm make sense of the verses you just quoted? Yes. But, you can’t bring a monergistic lens to an attempt to understand the Catholic paradigm. It won’t make sense. The response of the people to Peter’s preaching at Pentecost was strange “What must we do …” Peter should have replied, “Nothing, didn’t you just hear me? Jesus saved you from your sins. I just thought you should know. You can go home now.” Likewise, in a the Catholic paradigm, the word ‘save’ in the two verses you quoted does not mean ‘monergistically save.’ Grace does not destroy nature, nullifying or making superfluous our free response. We’re not just a bunch of rocks. We are humans made in the image of God, and thus saving us is not like saving rocks, or even like saving human bodies from drowning — that can be done even without the person’s cooperation. What is being saved is our soul (and hence our bodies), and what we are being saved from is an estrangement from God, and what we are being saved to is friendship with God. So our salvation requires a personal and free act on our part. That’s just the nature of entering into friendship. And that’s why the monergistic way of conceiving of our salvation either treats us as less than human, or treats salvation as less than friendship.
In short, if Jesus only provides the condition by which all men may save themselves if they choose to do so, but all may choose otherwise, then he is not a Savior at all, but seems rather impotent and weak.
The “then He is not a Savior at all” begs the question by assuming that saving can be only monergistic. In the Catholic paradigm, saving does not have to be monergistic in order to be saving.
As for “impotent and weak,” it may not be that the true doctrine of grace is rightly determined by asking “In which scenario does God exercise more power?” just as God’s providential relation to nature is not determined by asking that question, because in the latter case it would lead to the error of occasionalism, as I explained here. That’s because asking “In which scenario does God exercise more power?” or “Which theology gives God more glory?” are not safe ways of adjudicating between various theologies. Implicit in such a methodology is the assumption that our human reason is adequate to determine absolutely which theological position is more glorifying to God, or that God always chooses that course of action in which He exercises more of His own power. But sometimes our own reason is just not up for such a task, as when persons think occasionalism really would be more God-glorifying, not realizing that God is more glorified when He is shown to be the Creator of greater creatures with genuine secondary causal powers and genuine free will. Similarly, how can we know a priori that God always chooses the path of exercising more of His power? I mean, from my point of view, it seems presumptuous to think we could know that a priori. And it isn’t in Scripture, at least not clearly. The use of that criterion seems to be trying to make God into our own image, by making Him conform to our own reasoning in an a priori way. So, my response to the “impotent and weak” objection is to step back and ask why such a criterion should be thought to be a reliable indicator of how God acts. If it were a reliable theological test, we would have to treat the manger scene as a later interpolation — because Christ sure looks “impotent and weak” in the manger. Or we would have to wield the test in an arbitrary way, sometimes applying it, and sometimes not.
from comment 54 on the same link
from the same link comment 59 in part:from comment 54 on the same link
Jason, (re: #49/52/53)
Why can’t I just turn this around and say something like, “It cannot be said truly in the Catholic doctrine that God works all things out according to the counsel of his own will, or that he has his way among those in heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can say his hand or ask him, ‘What doest thou?’”? In the same way that our view seems to you to destroy God’s desire to save all men, it seems to us that yours destroys God’s ability to accomplish his will, both of which are equally Scriptural ideas. So unless your position can account for both, it does no good highlighting our problem texts as if that proves anything.
God does work all things out according to the counsel of His will, and He has His way among those in heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, and no one can stay His hand or call Him to account. But, God’s will is not that no other being exercise its will, or that He decide for each free creature what it will choose, and then let it live out this pre-determined program as if that creature had free choice. He is so much more generous. He has willed that there be real creatures truly endowed with free will, and that these free creatures truly and freely exercise their free will. This is precisely why there is a difference between God’s antecedent will and God’s consequent will, not because God is of two minds, but because His consequent will takes into consideration the free choices of His creatures. We know, for example, that God’s antecedent will is that all men always keep the Ten Commandments. But obviously, not all men keep the Ten Commandments. That does not “destroy God’s ability to accomplish His will.” He Himself has generously willed that we be given the power to freely choose contrary to His antecedent will. And yet even when we will what is contrary to God’s antecedent will, God is able to bring about through our choices the end He has willed, an end which takes into consideration our free choices.
The Calvinist position makes God either likewise impotent (since He can’t seem to prevent people from going against His will specified in the Ten Commandments), or insincere in implying that it is His will that we obey the Ten Commandments, if whatever is His will He necessarily accomplishes. Instead of attributing schizophrenia, impotence or insincerity to God, we explain the distinction between His antecedent will and consequent will as a distinction based on His generosity in giving to rational creatures genuine free choice, even the power to choose contrary to His antecedent will, as Lucifer did, and Adam and Eve as well. If you say that they sinned because God willed them to sin, you make God the author of evil. But if you say that they sinned because God willed them to have free will, and because they freely willed to sin, then you do not make God the author of evil, nor do you make Him weak. Rather, you affirm the generosity of His gift of rationality to creatures, and locate the blame for man’s sin on man himself.
I guess a more concise way to present my question is to ask, “If, as you say, Jesus has atoned for all people’s sins, then why would all people not end up in heaven?” And if the answer is “Because of their unbelief,” my next question would be, “Is unbelief a sin? If so, then didn’t Jesus atone for it? And of not, then why would it keep someone out of heaven?” Note that my objections above do not depend on the idea that God has “punished our sins in Christ.”
A few weeks ago I was reading St. Thomas’ Sermon-Conferences on the Apostles’ Creed. In what line of the Apostles’ Creed do you think he places the sacraments? “Communion of saints.” Here, I’ll type out the relevant paragraphs:
Just as in a physical body the operation of one member redounds to the good of the whole body, so it works in a spiritual body, that is to say, in the Church. Since all the faithful are one body, the good of one is communicated to another. Paul writes: “Thus, we who are many are one body in Christ,] individuals, yet members one of the other” [Rom 12:5]. Thus, among other matters which should be believed that the apostles handed down, there remains the communion of goods in the Church. This [doctrine] is called “the communion of saints.”Among all the other members of the Church, however, the principal member is Christ, for He is the Head of the Church: “[And] He put down everything under His feet, and] He put himself as Head over the whole Church, which is His Body, [the fullness of Him who fulfills everything in everyone]” (Eph. [1:22-23]). Therefore the good of Christ is communicated to all Christians, as the wisdom of the Head is communicated to all the members. This communion comes about through the sacraments of the Church, in which the strength of the passion of Christ for conferring grace and for forgiving sins operates.
Then he goes on to talk about baptism and the other sacraments. I’m sure you see why I quoted that, in reply to your question. The good of Christ, i.e. the grace merited by Christ through His passion and death, is communicated to us through the sacraments, in His Body, the Church. It must be applied to us. St. Chrysostom says that in the Eucharist Christ’s blood is applied to the doorposts of our mouth, as the blood of the Passover lamb had been applied to the doorposts of the homes of the Hebrews. If the work of Christ is not applied to us, we remain dead in our sins and at enmity with God. If we remain at enmity with God, we cannot be forgiven, because by our enmity we remain a cause of offense against God and hence remain in need of forgiveness. In order to be forgiven, that which is causing offense must be removed. Hence to be forgiven requires that we receive sanctifying grace and agape.
So regarding your “Is unbelief a sin? If so, then didn’t Jesus atone for it? And if not, then why would it keep someone out of heaven?”, yes, unbelief is a sin. And yes, Jesus atoned for it, in that it was for this sin among all the sins of the world that Christ offered Himself up as a sacrifice to the Father. But unless that person is united to Christ, and thus receives the benefits of Christ’s work into himself, the sacrifice that Christ made to the Father does that man no good. That’s because the problem between that man and God is not merely a forensic problem that Christ can ‘fix’ behind the scenes, in heaven. The problem between that man and God lies right in his own soul, in the absence of sanctifying grace, and the absence of charity, and the debt of his sins against God. That’s where the problem lies, and that’s the cause of the forensic problem. So long as the cause of his debt to God remains, it cannot be magically fixed in heaven. Unless his [internal] problem is removed, he remains unsaved, unregenerated, unjustified, and hell-bound. Only when he receives the grace which Christ merited through His passion and death is he restored to friendship with God.
Christ’s meriting grace through His passion and death does not ipso facto save us; the fruit of His passion and death has to be applied to us, through our union with Him. Through the sacraments we are united to Him and receive the grace He merited on the cross, and thus the forgiveness of sins. That’s why we believe in “one baptism for the forgiveness of sins.” The forensic problem is resolved through the grace received in the sacrament.
When Christ offered Himself up to the Father to make atonement for all the sins of every person who has ever lived, He [Christ] (and the Father and the Spirit) did not intend that human free will be abrogated or nullified in order to get every soul into heaven. Nor did any of the three divine Persons intend that sufficient grace be given only to a subset of men. Grace perfects nature; it does not destroy nature. All three Persons of the Trinity offer salvation to all men, through the grace Christ merited on the cross. God, through the merits of Christ’s passion and cross, gives to all men sufficient actual grace to turn to Him and receive sanctifying grace and agape, and be saved.
What I think you are getting at is the following objection: if the Son offers atonement to the Father for the sins of all men, but the Father predestines only some men, then the Father and the Son are not “on the same page.” But that objection would work only if predestination included the requirement of giving sufficient grace only to the elect. But the truth of predestination does not require that only the elect receive sufficient grace; the doctrine of predestination is fully compatible with the reprobate also receiving sufficient grace. Therefore, the Trinity can both predestine some men, and give to all men sufficient grace for salvation, without the members of the Godhead not “being on the same page.”
from comments 450 and 451 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/comment-page-10/#comment-102518 --
I was reading comment 64 over at the post herehttp://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/12/signs-of-predestination-a-catholic-discusses-election/. I thought my question would possibly be more in line with the topic here on the conceptions of the atonement.
It was stated in comment 64:
The atoning sacrifice of the Cross does indeed make satisfaction for the eternal punishment due the sins of all mankind, but does much more than that because it is an act of infinite mercy. Man, because he is a creature, cannot do anything that is infinite. All the sins that mankind has ever committed, or ever will commit, cannot add up to a sum that is infinitely evil. But the atoning sacrifice of the Cross is an infinite act of mercy, because what is being offered up on the Cross is the infinite love of God. To see the value of the atoning sacrifice of the Cross strictly in terms of satsisfaction is to miss the point of the atoning sacrifice altogether. The value of atoning sacrifice is much greater than what was required to satisfy the eternal punishment due the sins of all mankind. The true measure of the value of the atoning sacrifice is the infinite merits of the Cross, the outpouring of grace that allows man not only to be reconciled to God, but to partake in the divine life of God.
I realize our sins are not infinite, however Ott on page 178 explains that although the sins are not infinite the insult to God is infinite. Then on page 188 Ott says,
Christ’s actions possess an intrinsic infinite value, because the principium quod is the Divine person of the Logos. Thus Christ’s atonement was, through its intrinsic value, sufficient to counterbalance the infinite insult offered to God, which is inherent in sin.
Therefore because we would need a sacrifice of infinite value since we gave an infinite insult it appears to contradict the statement in the top quote from comment 64, ” The value of atoning sacrifice is much greater than what was required to satisfy the eternal punishment due the sins of all mankind. ” Was it not, then, necessary in order to satisfy the eternal punishment due to man, to have a sacrifice of infinite value or is there something I am misunderstanding?
ANSWER:
The “infinite insult” is infinite only secundum quid, not per se. That’s what is meant by “kind of infinity” in the following statement by St. Thomas:
because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity [quandam infinitatem] from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. (ST III Q.1 a.2.)
The act of sin consists of a turning away from God, and an inordinate turning to some finite, mutable good. Regarding this latter aspect of sin, as St. Thomas explains, “sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite.” (ST I-II Q.87 a.4.)
This is why no sin is infinite in quantity. The punishment of sin is infinite only in time (i.e. it is everlasting), in the perpetual loss of that from which the sinner has definitively turned away, as St. Thomas explains:
Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the “pain of loss,” which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. …And a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. (ST I-II Q.87 a.4)
Mortal sin is infinite only in that from which it turns away: “aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est infinitum.” Because mortal sin is not infinite per se, and because one infinite is not greater than another, this is why, as St. Thomas explains, the punishment of mortal sins is not all equal. But nevertheless, the punishment due for this sin is infinite in a certain respect, i.e. the everlasting loss of that from which the sinner has turned away. And yet this debt is such that mere man cannot pay it.
By contrast, the value of Christ’s atonement is infinite, because by the incarnation, God, who is infinite, is the One who makes it. In answer to the objection that since those who crucified Christ committed an infinite offense (by murdering God), therefore there was for them no forgiveness, St. Thomas writes:
Christ’s love was greater than His slayers’ malice: and therefore the value of His Passion in atoning surpassed the murderous guilt of those who crucified Him: so much so that Christ’s suffering was sufficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer’s crime. (ST III Q.48 a.2 ad 2.)
Likewise, in reply to the third objection in that article, he writes:
The dignity of Christ’s flesh is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the Person assuming it–namely, inasmuch as it was God’s flesh, the result of which was that it was of infinite worth.
And because the One acting is God, Christ’s satisfaction has infinite efficacy and a superabundant value:
from comments 453and 454Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency [ efficaciam infinitam], as being of God and man. (ST III Q.1 a.2.)And therefore Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; (ST III Q.48 a.2.)
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/#comment-103237
- I have a question for the Catholics on this blog. I’m trying to understand something.I’ve seen it explained as Christs sacrifice was more pleasing than all sin is displeasing (Catholic view). I was hoping someone could help unpack that a little further. If what Christ did was efficacious and more pleasing than all sin sin displeasing, why do Catholics have to participate in confession, and why are Catholics in and out of a state of grace? Is Christs act ‘potentially’ efficacious in Catholic paradigm?
- Grace does not destroy nature. We are rational beings by nature, and thus capable of free choice. Free choice is a great gift we have been given, because by it we participate in our formation, and thus not only in attaining our actual end, but also in determining our actual end, as I have explained in “The Gospel and the Meaning of Life.” Christ did not take that away from us. The God who created us is the same God who saves us. So the cross of Christ, and Christ’s loving sacrifice on our behalf, do not take away our power of free choice, neither at the moment of our conversion or at any subsequent point in the Christian life. Hence we can resist grace. And even as Christians we can, by this power of free choice fall into mortal sin, and even apostatize from the faith altogether.But just as at the level of nature we can participate in our own formation, so we can participate with grace in our own salvation, in freely believing the gospel, receiving baptism and the other sacraments, and working out our salvation in fear and trembling. Just as our cooperation with God in our sanctification does not entail that Christ’s work on the work on the cross was insufficient or inadequate, so our ability to sin, to apostatize, and to participate in our forgiveness (by going to confession), do not entail any inadequacy or insufficiency in the work of Christ (see comment #22 in the “Trent and the Gospel: A Reply to Tim Challies” thread). Our free participation in our salvation is not an indication of the inadequacy of Christ’s work, but rather that Marcionism is false — the God who made us is the same God who saves us, and thus participation is a gift that Christ does not steal from us in saving us. Otherwise, there would be no more reason for us to remain on earth after the moment of our conversion, as I’ve explained in “Monocausalism and Temporal Nihilism.” Because Marcionism is false, Christ the Savior does not rescue us from the Final Judgment by abducting us from that event, or causing us to bypass it. Rather, by Christ’s sacrifice not only are our sins forgiven through the sacraments He has established for that purpose, but He provides thereby the spiritual medicine and nourishment we need to live lives of heroic virtue, and be truly pleasing to God on that Day.So the problem with the “If Christ’s sacrifice was sufficient, why do we still need to do anything” objection is that it presupposes a false conception of what it means for Christ’s sacrifice to be sufficient. It presupposes that the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice means that nothing is left for us to do, as though salvation is a zero-sum matter, such that if we participate, then this must mean Christ accomplished something less than 100%. But that’s a man-made conception of what makes Christ’s sacrifice perfect. It also presupposes an implicit Marcionism. The God who created us did not leave us with nothing to do on earth. He did not take away our capacity to choose, to love Him or reject Him. The God who saves us is the same God who created us, and for the very same reason, in saving us He does not take away our capacity to choose, to love Him or reject Him. Rather, again, we are given the great gift of participation in our salvation, through faith, making use of the sacraments, prayer, fasting, good works, choosing not to sin, etc. That’s why your present ability to sin does not indicate that Christ’s sacrifice was inadequate or insufficient. The sufficiency of a sacrifice depends on the purpose of that sacrifice. And the purpose of Christ’s sacrifice was not to take away our participation in our salvation, or take away our power of choice, but to provide all that was necessary for our salvation through our participation in our salvation by way of our created faculties, including our power of choice.
in comment 448 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/08/imputation-and-paradigms-a-reply-to-nicholas-batzig/#comment-118692
The notion that there are two distinct ultimate moral standards is a return to a form of Manichean dualism. But if one rejects such dualism in favor of monotheism, and also conceives of the one ultimate moral standard as perfect law-keeping in the list-paradigm sense described above, then for a person who has sinned at least once, perfect sanctification is subsequently and permanently impossible. That’s because no how matter how much righteousness is attained by that person, since the past is unchanged (and unchangeable), the person can never attain the condition of having-perfectly-kept-all-the-laws. And in the list-paradigm, that is the only ultimate moral standard, given the falsity of Manichean dualism and the truth of monotheism. The highest sanctification that person will be able to attain remains in violation of the righteousness of the one and only ultimate standard of righteousness. Given this conception of righteousness, the ‘saved’ in heaven are necessarily therefore everlastingly unsanctified, i.e. never brought to perfect sanctification. Not only during this present life, but even in heaven forever, they remain simul iustus et peccator — not in the sense of continuing to sin, but in the sense that their sanctification (i.e. internal righteousness) is in violation of the standard of righteousness they have by extra nos imputation, and thus they remain unsanctified and intrinsically (as opposed to extra nos) unrighteous. Complete sanctification is therefore only possible for one who is innocent, not one who is guilty.
The notion that there are two distinct ultimate moral standards is a return to a form of Manichean dualism. But if one rejects such dualism in favor of monotheism, and also conceives of the one ultimate moral standard as perfect law-keeping in the list-paradigm sense described above, then for a person who has sinned at least once, perfect sanctification is subsequently and permanently impossible. That’s because no how matter how much righteousness is attained by that person, since the past is unchanged (and unchangeable), the person can never attain the condition of having-perfectly-kept-all-the-laws. And in the list-paradigm, that is the only ultimate moral standard, given the falsity of Manichean dualism and the truth of monotheism. The highest sanctification that person will be able to attain remains in violation of the righteousness of the one and only ultimate standard of righteousness. Given this conception of righteousness, the ‘saved’ in heaven are necessarily therefore everlastingly unsanctified, i.e. never brought to perfect sanctification. Not only during this present life, but even in heaven forever, they remain simul iustus et peccator — not in the sense of continuing to sin, but in the sense that their sanctification (i.e. internal righteousness) is in violation of the standard of righteousness they have by extra nos imputation, and thus they remain unsanctified and intrinsically (as opposed to extra nos) unrighteous. Complete sanctification is therefore only possible for one who is innocent, not one who is guilty.
This consequence does not follow under the agape paradigm, however, because the person’s righteousness is determined by the presence of agape in him or her. Under this paradigm even a horrendous sinner can become a great saint, because this person can come to have a great share ofagape. And on this paradigm, that’s just what sanctification in essence is, namely, having agape. Therefore, on this paradigm, every saint in heaven, including all those who sinned while on earth, can be, and is, truly and fully sanctified. Righteousness as agape allows there to be gradations of perfect righteousness, none in violation of Agape itself (Himself). Each saint in heaven is perfectly and completely sanctified, even though not all in heaven are equally sanctified. That is not a possibility in the list-paradigm conception of righteousness.
from a comment here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/12/mary-without-sin-scripture-and-tradition/#comment-126889
from a comment here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/12/mary-without-sin-scripture-and-tradition/#comment-126889
If Mary was born sinless and lived a sinless life, why did Jesus have to come?
Because what saved Mary from both original sin and actual sin was Christ’s sacrifice, as explained in the lecture here, especially the section on Bl. Duns Scotus.
Mary would have been a qualified sacrifice already, negating the need for Jesus to be born.
No, because to make satisfaction for sin, the sacrifice needed to be divine, not merely innocent, or innocent and obedient. St. Thomas addresses this in a number of places, and I’ll point you to some of them, because they provide much more detail than I can in a combox comment. In the first three articles of Summa Theologica III Q.46, he explains that because God is omniscient, and because our sin is ultimately against Him, He could have forgiven our sin without Christ’s atonement. But then he goes on to explain why it was necessary in another sense, i.e. most fitting, to demonstrate both the justice of God and the love of God. If a mere man had done what Christ did, it would not have made atonement for our sins, and it would not have demonstrated the love of God for us.
We see this again in Summa Theologica III Q.1 art.2, where St. Thomas answers the question “Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?” In the second paragraph of the “I answer that” you will find five reasons why it is was fitting for the Son of God to become man, in order to further man’s good. And in the third paragraph he gives five reasons why it is was fitting for the Son of God to become man, in order to free men from evil. And the second objection in that article is very helpful. It reads:
Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man’s charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate.
St. Thomas replies:
Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways–first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man’s satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly–i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ.
No mere man, says St. Thomas, could have made condign satisfaction for sin (i.e. an offering truly outweighing in its goodness the demerit of sin). That is because if a mere man were to offer satisfaction, it would not satisfy for the sins of the whole human race, and the harm done to the whole of human nature. The just penalty for sin against God (i.e. mortal sin) is an infinite penalty, because it is an offense against He who is infinite majesty. So the satisfaction had to have an infinite value, and the satisfaction offered by a mere man, or a group of mere men, would have only a finite value. To make a sufficient satisfaction for the sins of the whole world, the one making such a satisfaction must therefore be divine.
Similarly, because He is both God and man, He is the Mediator of God and men. A mere man could not be a proper mediator, as St. Thomas explains:
We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he is a mean; secondly, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and theHoly Ghost anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to theFather or the Holy Ghost, as though it were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him asman. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and byoffering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man. (Summa Theologica III Q.26 a.2)
A mediator is ‘distant’ from each extreme, and unites both by communicating to one what belongs to the other. Christ does this through His incarnation, because each of His two natures is distant from the other, and yet they are united in His Person through His incarnation, such that in Him God is man, and man is God. A mere man could not do that. We are united to God through this hypostatic union, through our union with the Body of Christ — both in the Eucharist and in the Church, which is His Mystical Body. But if there were no hypostatic union, then we could not be united to God through it. So this too is another reason why no mere man (or mere woman) could unite us to God
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