God's will and man's will--how related?

from comment 9 --a response to some questions concerning this subject found here http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/11/lawrence-feingold-on-gods-universal-salvific-will/#comment-178121
You wrote:

Rather, Aquinas believed that what God took into consideration was the greater good of the entire universe. That is to say, the way in which He desired to express His goodness to the fullest extent.

Nothing in the quotation you provided from St. Thomas even mentions antecedent or consequent will. So your claim that for St. Thomas, the distinction between antecedent and consequent will is based on taking into consideration either only the good of the individual (i.e. for the antecedent will) or also the good of the whole universe (i.e. for the consequent will), is an unsubstantiated claim.
Regarding this distinction (between God’s antecedent and consequent will) St. Thomas directly and explicitly ties it to the free choices of creatures, when, in answer to the question “Can the divine will be distinguished into antecedent and consequent?” he writes in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate:

In God’s operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing, matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance with the nature which He previously gave them. And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance with its own capacity.
That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfills in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains to His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfills in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God’s will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God with either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him. (QDV Q.23 a.2)

As St. Thomas explains, that to which God has destined the creature as far as God is concerned, is what is called God’s antecedent will. That’s not limited only to the individual creature’s good, nor does it disregard the common good. Rather, what the antecedent will does not take into consideration is the creature’s free response, as St. Thomas then goes on to explain. Because some persons freely work against their own salvation, and the order of God’s wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation “in view of their failure,” [in view of their sin of freely rejecting grace, they cannot then be saved, given the redemptive economy God has established, by which those who freely and permanently reject grace are allowed to remain in that condition forever] they therefore receive just punishment, because they are the one’s who have damned themselves, by freely and definitively rejecting the grace He offered them.
And for St. Thomas this free choice against God’s antecedent will is precisely the basis for the difference between God’s antecedent and consequent will, the very question St. Thomas is answering in this article. When the creature’s choice diverges from God’s antecedent will, the creature receives God’s secondary intention, or consequent will. For St. Thomas the failure to correspond to the offered grace is neither God’s antecedent will nor His consequent will. Rather, for St. Thomas, this sinful failure (from us) is precisely that by which God’s antecedent will is distinguished from God’s consequent will. Regarding the rejection of grace St. Thomas says something similar in the SCG when he writes:

In fact, as far as He is concerned, God is ready to give grace to all; “indeed He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” as is said in 1 Timothy (2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace. (SCG III. 159)

And in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales St. Thomas writes:

God moves everything according to its manner. So divine motion is imparted to some things with necessity; however, it is imparted to the rational nature with liberty because the rational power is related to opposites. God so moves the human mind to the good, however, that a man can resist this motion. And so, that a man should prepare himself for grace is from God, but that he should lack grace does not have its cause from God but from the man…. (Quodlibetales I. Q.4 a.2 ad 2)

And this fits completely with and explains what St. Thomas says in ST I Q.19 a.6 about the basis for the distinction between antecedent and consequent will.
It would be a mistake to infer from any truth in ST I Q.23 a.5 ad 3 that what St. Thomas says in SCG III.159 and in QDV Q.23 a.2 and in ST I Q.19 a.6 is false. The manifestation of God’s goodness through the creation of free creatures capable of freely sinning and allowed to reject grace freely in an irrevocable, everlasting way does not mean or entail that the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will is not our sins. God’s desire to manifest His goodness most fully through a myriad of grades of being in creatures, thereby including the creation of free creatures capable of sin, does not mean or entail that the creatures’ free choice to reject the grace offered to Him is not the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will. His desire to manifest His goodness through the creation of such creatures makes the distinction possible, but the creatures’ free, sinful choices makes the distinction actual. If every free creature always freely chose to obey God, as Christ in His human will always perfectly obeyed God, there would be no distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will; they would be one and the same.
You concluded:

Thus, to Aquinas, the consequent differed from the anticident will in that the consequent will considered the greater good of the universe.

The problem with that claim is that there is no evidence for it.

It was never the view of Aquinas that God first took into account our cooperation.

The problem with that claim is that what St. Thomas explicitly says directly refutes it.