predestination--a difference in Catholic and Protestants

This article link below explains some of the difference in the Catholic view of predestination

http://socrates58.blogspot.com/2010/04/biblical-evidence-against-double.html

also  http://www.thesumma.info/predestination/index.php   also

FROM COMMENT 68 

http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2009/05/predestination-john-calvin-vs-thomas-aquinas/

It seems to me that the difference between Calvin’s doctrine of reprobation, and that of the Catholic Church, should be clarified here. I agree that we should affirm common ground, but it is no less a vice to cover over actual disagreement than it is to find disagreement where there is none. And it seems to me that we should avoid both vices.

According to Calvin, reprobation is not consequent upon foreseen demerit, but is the reason why the reprobate fall into sin, remain in sin unto death, and so end up in hell as the just punishment for their sin. For Calvin, the reprobate are predestined to hell in the same way that the elect are predestined unto heaven, as an unconditional positive decree, to which the means to that end are then [in logical, not temporal order] determined. God decrees to damn some, and then [logically, not temporally] chooses the means of getting them to hell, namely, by decreeing their fall into sin, not giving them grace for salvation, and then justly punishing them for their sin. Calvin writes:

By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which He determined within Himself whatever He wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, we say that he has been predestinated to life or to death. (Institutes, III.21.6)

In the words, God created two groups of people; one group was created for heaven, and the other group was created for hell. The damned were created for the purpose of glorifying God by their damnation; their sin and remaining in sin unto death are means to achieving the end for which God created them.

At last, he [St. Paul] concludes that God has mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth (Rom. 9:18). You see how he refers both to the mere pleasure of God. Therefore, if we cannot assign any reason for his bestowing mercy on his people, but just that it so pleases him, neither can we have any reason for his reprobating others but his will. (Institutes III.22.11)

The reason God reprobates some is fundamentally His will, not any other reason, not on account of their foreseen demerit. (Here in this section, Calvin takes a divine command theory notion of the relation of God’s will to justice.)

Those, therefore, whom God passes by he reprobates, and that for no other cause but because he is pleased to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines to his children. … They [those who object to Calvin's doctrine] add also, that it is not without cause the vessels of wrath are said to be fitted for destruction, and that God is said to have prepared the vessels of mercy, because in this way the praise of salvation is claimed for God, whereas the blame of perdition is thrown upon those who of their own accord bring it upon themselves. But were I to concede that by the different forms of expression Paul softens the harshness of the former clause, it by no means follows, that he transfers the preparation for destruction to any other cause than the secret counsel of God. This, indeed, is asserted in the preceding context, where God is said to have raised up Pharaoh, and to harden whom he will. Hence it follows, that the hidden counsel of God is the cause of hardening. (Institutes III.23.1)

Again, for Calvin the reason for reprobation is not foreseen demerit, but God’s pleasure. God is pleased to exclude some of humanity from heaven, not because He foresees that they freely reject grace, but merely because it pleases Him to make some people for the purpose of eternal damnation. He says the same thing at the end of that section:

[W]e say, that God, according to the good pleasure of his will, without any regard to merit, elects those whom he chooses for sons, while he rejects and reprobates others. (Institutes III.23.10)

This notion of reprobation is contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church regarding reprobation. According to the Catholic teaching, hell is not positively decreed to the damned, and the reprobate are not predestined to fall into sin as a means to justly deserve hell. The Catholic teaching on reprobation can be seen in the Council of Orange (AD 529):

According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. (Council of Orange)

In this life the power of God does not leave anyone unable to avoid evil or be saved from evil, and thus the grace of God does not leave anyone unable to be saved. The notion that God foreordains anyone to evil by His power, rather than by allowing them to reject grace is anathematized.

This doctrine concerning reprobation can also be seen in the Council of Quiersy (AD 853):

The just and good God, however, chose from this same mass of perdition according to His foreknowledge those whom through grace He predestined to life [ Rom. 8:29 ff.; Eph. 1:11], and He predestined for these eternal life; the others, whom by the judgment of justice he left in the mass of perdition, however, He knew would perish, but He did not predestine that they would perish, because He is just; however, He predestined eternal punishment for them. (Denz. 316)

In other words, though God foreknew that the reprobate would perish, He did not predestine anyone to perish. He predestined a certain punishment [i.e. eternal punishment] for those whom He created for eternal life, but whom He knew would freely choose to reject grace, and whom He permitted to reject grace.

This same Catholic understanding of reprobation can be seen in the Third Council of Valence (AD 855):

Certainly neither (do we believe) that the foreknowledge of God has placed a necessity on any wicked man, so that he cannot be different, but what that one would be from his own will, as God, who knew all things before they are, He foreknew from His omnipotent and immutable Majesty. “Neither do we believe that anyone is condemned by a previous judgment on the part of God but by reason of his own iniquity.” “Nor (do we believe) that the wicked thus perish because they were not able to be good; but because they were unwilling to be good, they have remained by their own vice in the mass of damnation either by reason of original sin or even by actual sin.

[I]n the election, moreover, of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes the merited good. In the condemnation, however, of those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God. In predestination, however, (we believe) that God has determined only those things which He Himself either in His gratuitous mercy or in His just judgment would do …; in regard to evil men, however, we believe that God foreknew their malice, because it is from them, but that He did not predestine it, because it is not from Him. (We believe) that God, who sees all things, foreknew and predestined that their evil deserved the punishment which followed, because He is just, …. “But we do not only not believe the saying that some have been predestined to evil by divine power,” namely as if they could not be different, “but even if there are those who wish to believe such malice, with all detestation,” as the Synod of Orange, “we say anathema to them”. (Denz. 321-22)

Valence clarifies that by “predestined to evil by divine power” the meaning is that the reprobate could not but do evil, i.e. they could not choose to do right. And that entails that sufficient grace is offered to all, even the reprobate.

The Council of Trent likewise condemned double predestination, again with this language of divine power:

If anyone says that the grace of justification is shared by those only who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called are called indeed but receive not grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema. (Session VI, Canon 17)

Here again, the condemned position is one that predestines persons to evil by depriving them of the grace they need in order to obey God.

For Calvin it is false that God truly desires the salvation of all men without exception. But in the Catholic teaching God does desire the salvation of all men without exception; this is why (contra the Jansenists) the Church teaches that Christ died for all men without exception. (See here.) For Calvin, sufficient grace is not offered to the reprobate, but in Catholic doctrine sufficient grace is offered to all (otherwise, that would be double-predestination). For Calvin, the human will, being dead, does not participate voluntarily in regeneration (Institutes II.3.6), and cannot resist grace; therefore, since universalism is false, double predestination logically follows. But in Catholic doctrine, the will cooperates in regeneration (Council of Trent, VI, Canon 4), and can resist sufficient grace (which is offered to all), and therefore double predestination does not follow. So these are real, substantive differences between Calvin and the Catholic Church on the doctrine of reprobation.

In #53 you wrote:

but in my reading of Domingo Banez, he frequently quotes Romans 9:19 in his debates with the Jesuits. Of course, efficacious grace preserves the freedom of the will, but this grace is infallible in bringing about its intended effect. So, this grace is resistible in only a rather qualified sense, no?

For Báñez efficacious grace is not resistible, or at least not ultimately resistible, while sufficient grace is resistible. One difficulty for Báñez’s position is precisely in explaining how efficacious grace preserves the freedom of the will. I recommend listening to Prof. Feingold’s answer to question #5 in the Q&Ahere.

One problem with the Garrigou-Lagrrange quotation in #54 is that if all the persons who received efficacious grace (as conceived in the Báñezian sense) did not retain the power to resist in the very moment in which it was given, the result would be the same. For example, I could also say that when I throw a rock, it could dissent if it willed, and that the power to dissent remains, but that it never wills to dissent. But, of course, the problem is that the result would be the same if the rock had no power of dissent. So LG’s statement seems to be a merely semantic avoidance of the problem.

Another problem with the LG claim is that in the quotation LG seems to think that unless grace were irresistibly efficacious, it would not cause us to act. But that can’t be right, because of the following quadrilemma: Either (1) sufficient grace would not cause us to act, in which case either (a) sufficient grace is truly sufficient, in which case our action to salvation in response to sufficient grace would only our own motion, which would constitute Pelagianism, or (b) sufficient grace is not truly sufficient, Or(2) sufficient grace would cause us to act, in which case either (a) sufficient grace reduces to efficacious grace, which entails either universalism or Calvinism, or (b) sufficient grace is still grace but is not efficacious grace, in which case grace doesn’t have to be irresistibly efficacious in order to cause us to act. But (1a), (1b), and (2a) are problematic, and therefore (2b).

also form comment 89  here  http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2012/11/do-you-want-to-go-to-heaven/#comment-46915  quoted below:

I’ve been following this conversation and would like to comment on your interpretation of the scripture verses in #88. It seems to me that you are assuming that believers, after they once believe, cannot subsequently reject God and fall away after they once believed. This implies we have freedom until we believe, and we lose that freedom to reject Him after we once believe. But the verses you’re quoting simply don’t say this. Here’s some specifics:

Romans 8:29-30 – Catholics agree that the elect, the chosen, whom He foreknew, will end up in heaven. And with these chosen ones, He predestines, calls, justifies, and glorifies them. But notice that Paul doesn’t say that He glorifies all who are at some point justified, nor does it say He justifies all whom He calls, nor that He glorifies all whom He calls. On the contrary, Jesus says “Many are called, but few are chosen”. Similarly, Catholics believe that it’s possible to lose one’s justification (state of grace) through mortal sin, or the rejection of God. It’s also possible to recover that same justification.

John 10:27 – Catholics agree that He will not allow the sheep (the elect) to be snatched away or lost. But this verse says nothing about the goats in His flock. Note that the goats also call him “Lord” in Matthew 25:44.

2 Cor 12:9 – Catholics agree that We can’t get to heaven without sufficient grace. But sufficient grace does not mean I will for certain go to Heaven, because I can reject His grace. For example, I can have sufficient gas to get to work, but choose not to go to work. The sufficiency of His grace is compatible with our freedom to reject Him at any point along the journey. This is why we can believe that because of His perfect goodness and mercy, He offers _all_ men sufficient grace to get to Heaven.

1 Peter 1 – Catholics agree that God protects us – as long as we have faith. “you, who are protected by the power of God through faith“. Such protection is not guaranteed for those who reject Him and lose faith.

1 Ephesians 1 – The Holy Spirit is indeed a pledge to eternal inheritance, but it is also possible to “resist” the Holy Spirit, or blaspheme against that same Spirit.

When He saves us, He grafts us onto the vine of Christ. But if we don’t “remain” in Him, we wither and die. Dead faith is “dead” precisely because it was once alive, but is no longer so.

Luke 8 – “they believe for a while, but in the time of testing they fall away”
Rev 2:4 – “you have forsaken the love you had at first”.

The tension in this conversation is between God’s will that all men be saved, His sufficient grace which He gives to all men, and the free will which He gives to man to reject Him for some worldly desire which we may come to love more than Him. Rejection of God is possible not because God predestines some to be saved and some to reject Him. Turning our back on Him is possible because God has given all men the freedom to do so. His perfect love for all men, and His will to save all men, is contingent on our freedom to accept that gift of love (cooperate), or reject it. Neither justification, adoption, nor the gift Holy Spirit change this freedom. If freedom is good, then God must want us to have it even as His adopted children. But if freedom is not good, then He would not have given it to us in the first place.

What I would not do is assume you are one of the elect (the sheep). Don’t assume that if you put God to the test and willingly and knowingly disobey Him that He will somehow override your free will and force you to repentance. Rather, “work out your salvation in fear and trembling” , while knowing that nothing can separate you from His love.

good article at the encylopedia:http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12378a.htm

an audio --this audio was not really very helpful however  here on Catholic Answers http://www.catholic.com/radio/shows/are-you-predestined-4713#

The limits that the Catholic Church sets for the doctrine are given in the newadvent.org encylopedia article:

Owing to the infallible decisions laid down by the Church, every orthodox theory on predestination and reprobation must keep within the limits marked out by the following theses: (a) At least in the order of execution in time (in ordine executionis) the meritorious works of the predestined are the partial cause of their eterna lhappiness; (b) hell cannot even in the order of intention (in ordine intentionis) have been positively decreed to the damned, even though it is inflicted on them in time as the just punishment of their misdeeds; (c) there is absolutely no predestination to sin as a means to eternal damnation. Guided by these principles, we shall briefly sketch and examine three theories put forward by Catholic theologians.

from an article here  http://vivacatholic.wordpress.com/2007/08/12/predestination-in-catholicism/ the quotes below"

 If God gives His Grace to every one and desires all men to be saved, then why can’t all enter heaven?  Scripture says that God gives His Grace lavishly to the Elect (Ephesians 1:7-8) and He has mercy but also hardens the hearts of whom He will (cf. Romans 9:18).  This is something we cannot question – God is the potter and we are the clay (Romans 9:20-21).  In Catholic Church’s terminology God gives the Elect sufficient and efficacious Grace while the Reprobates receive sufficient but inefficaciousGrace.  Catholics believe God gives everyone sufficient Grace to make him/her, using his/her freedom, turn to God and be saved.  One way to explain it is using Jesus’ parable of the talents (Matthew 25:14-30).  In the parable the Master gave different number of talents to his three servants according to their abilities.  The Master obviously had the right to decide how many talents each servant received. The servant with only one talent was later condemned.  Yet his Master did not intend to condemn him by giving him only one talent.  Had he deposited it in the bank he would be fine like the other two.  The servant was condemned for his own wrong action, i.e. hiding the single talent entrusted to him.  Thus Catholics believe that condemnation of the Reprobate always involves their freedom to reject God’s Grace – in other words they are responsible for their damnation.  Catholic’s view on Reprobation is called as Positive Conditional Reprobation – when God created the world He, being omniscience, foresaw the Reprobate’s rejection to His Grace and let them use their freedom to do so.  Yet God still wants them to be saved and still gives them sufficient Grace.  

“To God, all moments of time are present in their immediacy. When therefore he establishes his eternal plan of ‘predestination’, he includes in it each person’s free response to his grace: ‘In this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the peoples of Israel, gathered together against your holy servant Jesus, whom you anointed, to do whatever your hand and your plan had predestined to take place [Acts 4:27-28]. For the sake of accomplishing his plan of salvation, God permitted the acts that flowed from their blindness. 

Catechism of the Catholic Church # 600

Catholics, on the other hand, believe that without God’s Grace we can neither believe in God nor obey His commandments – our salvation is impossible without God’s Grace but we have freedom to cooperate with that Grace or not.

To Calvinists God gives His (saving) Grace only to the Elect who can neither reject nor lose it.   However Jude 4 says that those who were designated for condemnation pervert the Grace of God – something they cannot do if they do not receive it in the first place.  The belief that God gives His Grace only to the Elect was condemned in the Council of Trent.

If any one saith, that the grace of Justification is only attained to by those who are predestined unto life; but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema.

Council of Trent, Canon XVII of the Decrees on Justification

Calvinists may use God’s sovereignty to defend their position.  But here they make presumption, i.e. God first foreordained the Reprobate to eternal damnation when He created the world and because He is sovereign then His will must take place.  Catholics do not deny that God is sovereign but He cannot contradict Himself.   Scripture does say that God through Christ intends to save all mankind (Romans 5:18, 1 Corinthians 15:22, 1 Timothy 1:15, Titus 2:11) – He won’t contradict Himself by, through His decree, foreordaining some (the Reprobate) with no reason to hell....
from a comment on the post:

If you interpret Romans 9:16 to mean God predestines some to hell, you contradict Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22. Scripture would not contradict itself but your interpretation does, unless you fine tune Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22, i.e. to make “all” to mean “all Elect”, which those verses DO NOT say. Catholics and Calvinists believe that the Fall make us born in sinful state – we do not deserve heaven unless God takes the initiative to save us. The initiative does not come from us – we do not have the will to be saved (those who say we do are semi-pelagian which most, if not all Calvinists confuse with synergism). Catholics do not believe all will go to heaven but unlike Calvinists we believe that they (the Reprobate) end-up in hell because they choose so, NOT because God decided not to regenerate them. In Catholicism God offer salvation to ALL and He does predestine the Elect to heaven by giving them sufficient and efficacious grace. God gives the Reprobate sufficient grace but NOT efficacious grace because He has mercy to whom He will and harden whom He will (Romans 9:15). Sufficient grace implies it is the Reprobate to blame for their damnation. Thus Catholics have no problem with Romans 9:15 and we do not need to tune Titus 2:11 and 1 Cor 15:22 like Calvinists do. Eph 2:8 is one the most quoted verse to justify faith alone salvation. Catholics do believe that faith is gift from God through His grace who gives it to use NOT because we do something to deserve it.

see his comments section for a lot more!

Matt 23:37“O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it! How often would I have gathered your children together as a hen gathers her brood under her wings, and you would not!

On the death of Christ comment   209 here:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2010/04/catholic-and-reformed-conceptions-of-the-atonement/#comment-51695

To return to a much earlier analogy in this thread (comments 46-52): I don’t see how Jesus being crucified is different from the video store clerk tasing an innocent person, which you said would be unjust. God is willing and demanding the suffering of an innocent person–what is the difference whether you talk about it as the clerk (or God) “pouring out wrath” or whether you call it the other person (or Jesus) “offering a gift” to the clerk of allowing himself to be tased. It’s the same thing that you’re talking about.

Because God did not crucify His Son anymore than Jesus committed suicide. We killed Jesus. God planned this in accord with our free sinful choices, and allowed His Son to be handed over to be condemned, scourged, crucified, and killed, by us.

You wrote:

Either way, it seems twisted that what pleases the clerk is to see someone get tased. And it seems twisted that what pleases God is to see someone voluntarily suffer and die. Wouldn’t a video store clerk who killed a third party, or who demanded that some third party step in front a train, in order to pay for a late video, be acting unjustly?

Exactly. That’s precisely why it is essential to realize, as St. Peter preaches, that this Man “you nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death”. (Acts 2:23) God’s plan works through our foreseen free choices. Jesus did not commit suicide; He allowed us to kill Him, in order to effect our redemption. Likewise, God the Father did not kill His Son; He allowed us to do so, in order to effect our redemption. It did not please God the Father to hand over His Son to death per se; nor did such a death per se please the Son. Rather, what pleased the Father and the Son was the salvation of the world through the self-giving sacrifice of the Son by the hands of sinful men.


from comment 24 http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2014/01/saved-by-love-alone-a-seminary-wifes-journey/#comment-78853

If parents ought not doubt the election of their children (agreed to above), how do you think they should be viewed?

The Catholic doesn’t have this problem, because in Catholic teaching regeneration (which comes through the baptism of the infant) does not entail election-to-glory, and because election-to-glory status is known only to God. Hence the parents make no presumption either way concerning their childrens’ election-to-glory status, just as they make no presumption about their own elect-to-glory status.

Also from comment nine in dealing with God's will and man's will and predestination:
http://www.calledtocommunion.com/2011/11/lawrence-feingold-on-gods-universal-salvific-will/#comment-178121
Ken, (re: #8)
You wrote:

Rather, Aquinas believed that what God took into consideration was the greater good of the entire universe. That is to say, the way in which He desired to express His goodness to the fullest extent.

Nothing in the quotation you provided from St. Thomas even mentions antecedent or consequent will. So your claim that for St. Thomas, the distinction between antecedent and consequent will is based on taking into consideration either only the good of the individual (i.e. for the antecedent will) or also the good of the whole universe (i.e. for the consequent will), is an unsubstantiated claim.
Regarding this distinction (between God’s antecedent and consequent will) St. Thomas directly and explicitly ties it to the free choices of creatures, when, in answer to the question “Can the divine will be distinguished into antecedent and consequent?” he writes in Quaestiones disputatae de veritate:

In God’s operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing, matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance with the nature which He previously gave them. And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance with its own capacity.
That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfills in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains to His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfills in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God’s will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God with either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him. (QDV Q.23 a.2)

As St. Thomas explains, that to which God has destined the creature as far as God is concerned, is what is called God’s antecedent will. That’s not limited only to the individual creature’s good, nor does it disregard the common good. Rather, what the antecedent will does not take into consideration is the creature’s free response, as St. Thomas then goes on to explain. Because some persons freely work against their own salvation, and the order of God’s wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation “in view of their failure,” [in view of their sin of freely rejecting grace, they cannot then be saved, given the redemptive economy God has established, by which those who freely and permanently reject grace are allowed to remain in that condition forever] they therefore receive just punishment, because they are the one’s who have damned themselves, by freely and definitively rejecting the grace He offered them.
And for St. Thomas this free choice against God’s antecedent will is precisely the basis for the difference between God’s antecedent and consequent will, the very question St. Thomas is answering in this article. When the creature’s choice diverges from God’s antecedent will, the creature receives God’s secondary intention, or consequent will. For St. Thomas the failure to correspond to the offered grace is neither God’s antecedent will nor His consequent will. Rather, for St. Thomas, this sinful failure (from us) is precisely that by which God’s antecedent will is distinguished from God’s consequent will. Regarding the rejection of grace St. Thomas says something similar in the SCG when he writes:

In fact, as far as He is concerned, God is ready to give grace to all; “indeed He wills all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,” as is said in 1 Timothy (2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace who offer an obstacle within themselves to grace. (SCG III. 159)

And in the Quaestiones Quodlibetales St. Thomas writes:

God moves everything according to its manner. So divine motion is imparted to some things with necessity; however, it is imparted to the rational nature with liberty because the rational power is related to opposites. God so moves the human mind to the good, however, that a man can resist this motion. And so, that a man should prepare himself for grace is from God, but that he should lack grace does not have its cause from God but from the man…. (Quodlibetales I. Q.4 a.2 ad 2)

And this fits completely with and explains what St. Thomas says in ST I Q.19 a.6 about the basis for the distinction between antecedent and consequent will.
It would be a mistake to infer from any truth in ST I Q.23 a.5 ad 3 that what St. Thomas says in SCG III.159 and in QDV Q.23 a.2 and in ST I Q.19 a.6 is false. The manifestation of God’s goodness through the creation of free creatures capable of freely sinning and allowed to reject grace freely in an irrevocable, everlasting way does not mean or entail that the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will is not our sins. God’s desire to manifest His goodness most fully through a myriad of grades of being in creatures, thereby including the creation of free creatures capable of sin, does not mean or entail that the creatures’ free choice to reject the grace offered to Him is not the basis for the distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will. His desire to manifest His goodness through the creation of such creatures makes the distinction possible, but the creatures’ free, sinful choices makes the distinction actual. If every free creature always freely chose to obey God, as Christ in His human will always perfectly obeyed God, there would be no distinction between God’s antecedent and consequent will; they would be one and the same.
You concluded:

Thus, to Aquinas, the consequent differed from the anticident will in that the consequent will considered the greater good of the universe.

The problem with that claim is that there is no evidence for it.

It was never the view of Aquinas that God first took into account our cooperation.

The problem with that claim is that what St. Thomas explicitly says directly refutes it.

from comment 23 on this same linked post:

This notion of reprobation is contrary to the teaching of the Catholic Church regarding reprobation. According to the Catholic teaching, hell is not positively decreed to the damned, and the reprobate are not predestined to fall into sin as a means to justly deserve hell. The Catholic teaching on reprobation can be seen in the Council of Orange (AD 529):

According to the catholic faith we also believe that after grace has been received through baptism, all baptized persons have the ability and responsibility, if they desire to labor faithfully, to perform with the aid and cooperation of Christ what is of essential importance in regard to the salvation of their soul. We not only do not believe that any are foreordained to evil by the power of God, but even state with utter abhorrence that if there are those who want to believe so evil a thing, they are anathema. (Council of Orange)

In this life the power of God does not leave anyone unable to avoid evil or be saved from evil, and thus the grace of God does not leave anyone unable to be saved. The notion that God foreordains anyone to evil by His power, rather than by allowing them to reject grace is anathematized.

This doctrine concerning reprobation can also be seen in the Council of Quiersy (AD 853):

The just and good God, however, chose from this same mass of perdition according to His foreknowledge those whom through grace He predestined to life [ Rom. 8:29 ff.; Eph. 1:11], and He predestined for these eternal life; the others, whom by the judgment of justice he left in the mass of perdition, however, He knew would perish, but He did not predestine that they would perish, because He is just; however, He predestined eternal punishment for them. (Denz. 316)

In other words, though God foreknew that the reprobate would perish, He did not predestine anyone to perish. He predestined a certain punishment [i.e. eternal punishment] for those whom He created for eternal life, but whom He knew would freely choose to reject grace, and whom He permitted to reject grace.

This same Catholic understanding of reprobation can be seen in the Third Council of Valence (AD 855):

Certainly neither (do we believe) that the foreknowledge of God has placed a necessity on any wicked man, so that he cannot be different, but what that one would be from his own will, as God, who knew all things before they are, He foreknew from His omnipotent and immutable Majesty. “Neither do we believe that anyone is condemned by a previous judgment on the part of God but by reason of his own iniquity.” “Nor (do we believe) that the wicked thus perish because they were not able to be good; but because they were unwilling to be good, they have remained by their own vice in the mass of damnation either by reason of original sin or even by actual sin.

[I]n the election, moreover, of those who are to be saved, the mercy of God precedes the merited good. In the condemnation, however, of those who are to be lost, the evil which they have deserved precedes the just judgment of God. In predestination, however, (we believe) that God has determined only those things which He Himself either in His gratuitous mercy or in His just judgment would do …; in regard to evil men, however, we believe that God foreknew their malice, because it is from them, but that He did not predestine it, because it is not from Him. (We believe) that God, who sees all things, foreknew and predestined that their evil deserved the punishment which followed, because He is just, …. “But we do not only not believe the saying that some have been predestined to evil by divine power,” namely as if they could not be different, “but even if there are those who wish to believe such malice, with all detestation,” as the Synod of Orange, “we say anathema to them”. (Denz. 321-22)

Valence clarifies that by “predestined to evil by divine power” the meaning is that the reprobate could not but do evil, i.e. they could not choose to do right. And that entails that sufficient grace is offered to all, even the reprobate.

The Council of Trent likewise condemned double predestination, again with this language of divine power:

If anyone says that the grace of justification is shared by those only who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called are called indeed but receive not grace, as if they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema. (Session VI, Canon 17)

Here again, the condemned position is one that predestines persons to evil by depriving them of the grace they need in order to obey God.

For Calvin it is false that God truly desires the salvation of all men without exception. But in the Catholic teaching God does desire the salvation of all men without exception; this is why (contra the Jansenists) the Church teaches that Christ died for all men without exception. For Calvin, sufficient grace is not offered to the reprobate, but in Catholic doctrine sufficient grace is offered to all (otherwise, that would be double-predestination). For Calvin, the human will, being dead, does not participate voluntarily in regeneration (Institutes II.3.6), and cannot resist grace; therefore, since universalism is false, double predestination logically follows. But in Catholic doctrine, the will cooperates in regeneration (Council of Trent, VI, Canon 4), and can resist sufficient grace (which is offered to all), and therefore double predestination does not follow. So these are real, substantive differences between Calvin and the Catholic Church on the doctrine of reprobation.

and from comment 23 on same post in answer to the following indented statement:

But Thomas himself isd deliberate is saying that the non-elect is not loved by God.

Except he does not say that. In saying “but He does not wish every good to them all” the “does not wish” refers to the divine plan to allow men freely to reject Him, and to His consequent will which takes into consideration their free rejection of the truly sufficient grace He offers them. Just because for St. Thomas predestination is not based on foreseen merits it does not follow that for St. Thomas the reprobation of any particular individual (as opposed to the divine plan to allow men freely to reject Him) is not based on foreseen rejection of grace.